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 ABSTRACT 
 
The price elasticity of demand for microcredit serves as an essential tool in 
defining demand for microcredit and subsequently in designing relevant policy and 
industry products. With the aim of describing consumer preferences for microcredit, 
this thesis carries two objectives. These are to extract the loan demand schedules and 
elasticities of borrowers of Esperanza International, a microfinance institution 
operating in the Dominican Republic, and to then examine the demographic 
characteristics and borrowing behavior that are correlated with differences in these 
measures.  
Using client reactions to changes in monthly interest rates by intervals of one 
percent per month between zero percent and eight percent, this study finds that 
demand is heterogeneous but largely linear and downward sloping. We draw a best-
fit elasticity measure, and find that borrower demand approaches unit-elasticity at 4 
percent monthly interest. These findings contrast with more inelastic estimates of 
elasticity of demand among the poor and extreme poor in the literature, and 
furthermore suggest that Esperanza is operating at profit maximizing levels.  
To examine variation among clients, this thesis models demand elasticity as a 
function of demographic characteristics, business profile, personal financial 
behavior, and borrowing history as recorded by Esperanza. Ordinary least squares 
and tobit regression results indicate that clients who were more comfortable taking 
risks in order to increase profits and who have acquired vocational training exhibit 
more elastic demand. In contrast, clients who derive the majority of their income 
from wage labor, those who are at the onset of developing their business, those who 
consider themselves credit rationed, and those who were able to recall the interest 
rate on their loan emerge with significantly more inelastic demand. These findings 
suggest that entrepreneurial drive or skill level, financial literacy, and cultural 
dissimilarities are correlated with the price elasticity of demand for microcredit and 
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1.1 Interest Rates in Microfinance 
Microfinance institutions (MFI) respond to a demand for formal credit and 
savings services among the poor and extreme poor. Whether prioritizing poverty 
alleviation or commercial growth, MFI success necessarily depends upon accurate 
market profiling and product development. There is however, a shortage of literature 
modeling optimal MFI interest rates.  
The global nature of MFI and the varying circumstances in which institutions 
are founded and managed have contributed considerable confusion and controversy 
to the question of allegedly prohibitive interest rates in the industry (Collins et. al, 
2009).  As it stands, MFI annual interest rates may exceed 85 to 100 percent, a clear 
contrast to the market rates offered in more developed economies (Rosenberg, 2007; 
Rosenberg, Gonzalez & Narain, 2009). Higher MFI interest rates are often accounted 
for by the higher operating costs of managing micro-loans, a cost which in part 
includes a variation in service delivery expenses (MIX Market, 2009). The poor are 
sensitive to price, write Collins et. al. (2009), but just as all consumers, they are 
willing to pay for convenience and flexibility. The degree to which these interest 
rates may exclude borrowers from the market, however, is critical in understanding 
industry impact and potential for growth (Banerjee & Duflo, 2010).  
Muhammed Yunus, the economist credited with popularizing microfinance in 
the 1970’s with the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh, vocally opposes what he defines 
as profit-maximizing microcredit programs (2007). Yunus has been outraged by 
annual interest rates that exceed 100 percent, as in the case of Compartamos in 
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Mexico (Collins et. al, 2009; Yunus, 2007). He describes the proliferation of such 
MFI as the “return of the moneylender,” and promotes instead the development of 
what he considers to be poverty-focused microcredit programs (2007). To qualify as 
such, MFI must charge interest rates that equal the cost of funds plus 10 to 15 percent 
annually (Yunus, 2007).  
In a review of the classification scheme, Gonzalez (2010) finds that 75% of 
1,002 MFI reporting to MIX Market in 2008 would qualify as profit-maximizing 
microcredit programs. Of these, Gonzalez finds that an estimated 95% of MFI in 
Latin America would classify as such. However, the report finds that Yunus’ 
methodology does not account for the inherent global variation in the real costs of 
microlending. The results confirm the heterogeneity of the demand for microcredit 
and in MFI operations generally. The question of prohibitively high interest rates 
remains unsettled and reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the demand for 
microcredit.    
1.2 Elasticity of Demand for Microcredit  
The elasticity of demand was first described as an elasticity of “wants” by the 
English economist Alfred Marshall in 1890 (Marshall, 1922). With this unit-free 
measure, Marshall sought to define and compare consumer responsiveness to the 
supply and price changes of charcoal, salt, and “wall-fruit” among other goods.  
Marshall posits,  
 
The elasticity (or responsiveness) of demand in a market is great or small 
according as the amount demanded increases much or little for a given fall in 
price, and diminishes much or little for a given rise in price.1 
 
                                                
1	  Marshall, p. 102	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In the century following this introduction to the concept, elasticity has been 
widely investigated and utilized. As is the case with elasticity measures for other 
consumer goods, the price elasticity of demand for microcredit is a valuable tool in 
examining the demand for microcredit.      
Studies have traditionally placed price elasticity estimates among 
microentrepreneurs as inelastic (Kochar, 1997; Bell et al, 1997; Karlan & Zinman, 
2008) or in other words have suggested that the poor and extreme poor are relatively 
irresponsive to interest rate changes. Where credit is more difficult to acquire, it is 
reasoned, it will rise in value.  Other and more recent analyses have estimated 
relatively more elastic demand (Dehija et al, 2007) or have indicated an increase in 
elasticity with the length of the loan term (Karlan & Zinman, 2008).  
These studies, however, have all derived estimates from loan contract data, 
and as a result cannot fully account for borrowers’ true preferences. It is reasonable 
to assume that these measures may therefore generate estimates that are biased 
towards inelasticity.  
1.3 Research Objectives 
Despite the significance of microcredit in developing entrepreneurship and 
improved livelihoods amongst the resource poor, very little is known of the 
underlying economic relationship between the borrower and lender. This relationship 
is described in its entirety under the classical Marshallian economic model with a 
demand curve and corresponding demand elasticity. However significant this 
relationship may be, we are unaware of any study that has investigated these demand 
schedules and elasticities at the individual level. The purpose of this study is to 
explicitly measure the demand for microcredit on such an individual level and derive 
corresponding elasticities.  
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To achieve this purpose, the study defines two key objectives. The first of 
these is to evaluate microcredit demand among entrepreneurs borrowing from an 
MFI in the Dominican Republic. The second objective is to determine the 
endogenous factors that are correlated with credit demand generally and with credit 
demand elasticities more particularly.  
In accomplishing the first of these objectives, this study derives price 
elasticity of demand estimates from individual loan demand information collected by 
the author and a team of interviewers in the Dominican Republic. To achieve the 
second of these objectives, this study regresses elasticity estimates against 
demographic characteristics as well as borrowing and investment behavior. If 
elasticity can be correlated with client or loan characteristics, it would contribute to 
the development of more efficient policy and microcredit products.  
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Chapter 2 
REGION, COUNTRY AND MFI CONTEXT 
 
2.1 Microfinance in Latin America 
According to recent measurements by the Financial Access Initiative (2009), 
135 million adults in Latin America, or 35 percent of the adult population, remain 
outside the formal financial sphere. Though demand for microcredit among these 
individuals has not been specified, the estimate suggests considerable potential for 
industry growth. Furthermore, an index compiled by the Economist Intelligence Unit 
(EIU, 2009) ranks Latin America as having the most attractive business environment 
for microfinance globally.2 Following the economic downturn of 2008, it Latin 
American MFI growth rates indeed remained positive (CGAP, 2008). 
Within Latin America, the term “microcredit” first emerged in describing a 
United Nations project of the 1970’s in Recife, Brazil (Palmer, 2009).  By 1978, the 
prominent Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) began financing MFI projects 
in the region and as of 2003, has provided US$120 million to fund 212 microfinance 
projects (Palmer, 2009). The Dominican Republic, along with Colombia, is 
considered one of the first Latin American countries to have more consistently 
developed and experimented with microfinance models (Berger, Goldmark, & Miller 
Sanabria, 2006). 
                                                
2 This index indicates integrates measures of the investment climate, regulatory framework, and 
institutional development. The regulatory framework index is derived from measures of the regulation 
of microfinance institutions, the formation and regulation of regulated/supervised specialized MFI, as 
well as regulatory and examination capacity. The investment climate index is derived from measures 
of political stability, capital market development, judicial system development, accounting standard 
development, governance standard development, and MFI transparency. The institutional 
development index is derived from three measures: the range of MFI services, the presence of credit 
bureaus, and the level of competition. 
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When considered in a global context, larger Latin American MFI tend to be 
more commercially oriented with respect to operations, financial performance, 
financing, and ownership (Berger, Goldmark, & Miller Sanabria, 2006). In 2007 for 
example, Latin America hosted the first initial public offering (IPO) of an MFI with 
Compartamos in Mexico (Rosenberg, Gonzalez & Narain, 2009). MFI in the region 
have also distinguished themselves as relatively more adaptable and responsive to 
consumer demand, as having greater urban concentrations of clients, and as having a 
more diverse client base (Berger, Goldmark, & Miller Sanabria, 2006).  
Information regarding MFI interest rates is not readily available for Latin 
America or the Dominican Republic, but a proxy has been derived using data from 
the Microfinance Information Exchange (MIX Market). This proxy, known as a 
microfinance ratio, calculates nominal financial revenue as a share of average loan 
portfolio. According to the measure, interest rates among MFI in Latin America 
likely declined between 2007 and 2008 with a weighted average of 29.5% annual by 
2008 (EIU, 2009). In the Dominican Republic, the average microfinance ratio among 
the four MFI that provided financial information to MIX Market stood slightly 
higher at 33.6% annual (EIU, 2009).  
In 2008, the average borrower in Latin America and the Caribbean held larger 
loans than borrowers in other regions of the world. According to an industry survey 
Latin American microfinance loans averaged at US$780, more than twice the size of 
the average loans offered by African, Middle Eastern, North African, and Asian MFI 
(MIX Market, 2009).3 MFI in Latin America or the Caribbean also report relatively 
higher costs per loan at US$167. This is higher than that of African, Middle Eastern, 
North African and Asian MFI (MIX Market, 2009).4 When considering the 
                                                
3	  US$308 among MFI in Africa, US$166 among Asian MFI, and US$317 among MFI in the Middle 
East and North Africa (MIX Market, 2009)	  
4	  US$132 among African MFI, US$71 among MFI in the Middle East and North Africa and US$71 
among Asian MFI (MIX Market, 2009)	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percentage of portfolio at risk, MFI in Latin America and the Caribbean rank second 
among the same regions of the world with 4.2% of their assets at risk (MIX Market, 
2009).  
2.2 Economy of the Dominican Republic 
The Dominican Republic occupies the eastern portion of the island of 
Hispaniola in the Caribbean (Figure 1). As of 2007, the Dominican Republic’s Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate ranked as fifth highest among Latin American 
countries with a GDP per capita of US$4,816 in 2009 (Figure 2) (ECLAC, 2007; 





Figure 1. The Dominican Republic with Participating Esperanza BranchesOutlined 5 
 
 
                                                
5 Los Alcarrizos and Los Guaricanos offices are included within the vicinity of Santo Domingo; 
Image Source: http://www.getawaybahamas.com/dominican_republic.htm 
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Figure 2. Gross National Product Per Capita USD, 1991-2009 
 
Though the country’s economy was traditionally based on agriculture, sugar 
being the primary agricultural export, emphasis has since shifted to 
telecommunications, manufacturing, tourism, and other services (Figure 3) (Alonso, 
2001; CBDR 2010). These shifts have been driven significantly by the inflow of 
foreign direct investment, especially from the United States (Palmer, 2009). 
 
 
Figure 3. Gross National Product by Sector, Dominican Republic 6 
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In the past decade, the interest rates offered by formal financial institutions 
have varied considerably in the DR (Figure 4). The country experienced an economic 
crisis in the early 2000’s during which interest rates dropped into the negative. Since 
2005 however, they have largely stabilized with a mean annual interest rate of 19.52 
percent (Figure 4).  
 
 
Figure 4. Real Interest Rates in the Dominican Republic by Financial Entity,     
2000-2009 7 
As of March 2010, the total loan portfolio in the DR was growing at an 
annual rate of 18.7% (CBDR, 2010). Among Dominican provinces represented in the 
study sample, Santo Domingo, San Pedro de Macoris and Puerto Plata reported the 
largest amount of bank holdings (Figure 5). The provinces of Hato Mayor and el 




                                                
7 CBDR 
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Figure 5. Bank Holdings in the Dominican Republic by Surveyed Province, 1990-
2010 9  
In the past decade, unemployment rates have remained relatively stable and 
have been decreasing (Figure 6). As of 2009, they stood at roughly 10 and 24 percent 
for men and women respectively (Figure 6). Within this measure, the unemployment 
rate includes individuals who are  actively seeking work or who are willing to work 
even if not actively seeking work (CBDR, 2010). The disparity between men and 
women is representative of culturally assumed gender roles, where men will more 
often work for wage labor while women manage households (Rodriguez, 2010). 
Paternalistic assumptions and beliefs are pervasive in the Dominican Republic 
(Rodriguez, 2010). 
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Figure 6. Unemployment Rate by Gender in the Dominican Republic, 2000-2009 10 
 
The most recent national census revealed an overall literacy rate of 78% in 
the DR (ONE, 2002). On a national scale, data collected in 2009 indicated that the 
average college educated individual in that year earned roughly US$3.37 per hour as 
compared to the average uneducated individual who earned US$1.09 per hour 
(Figure 7).11  
 
                                                
10 CBDR 
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Figure 7. Mean Income per Hour by Level of Education in the Dominican Republic, 
2009 12 
 
2.3 Financial Sector Development in the Dominican Republic  
The Dominican Republic established the Central Bank and the Banking 
Superintedency in 1947 and subsequently established the Insurance Superintendency 
and the National Housing Bank. Together, these four institutions regulate the 
Dominican financial sector (McDonald & Ledgerwood, 1999).  
However, far before this in 1919, a ceiling of 12% annual interest was set on 
all lending rates offered in the formal banking sphere. With inflation rates ranging 
between 11 and 15 percent in 1970s and 1980s, credit was often offered at close to 
zero percent interest (Vargas-Lundius, 1991). Though policy intended to redistribute 
income to poorer households, the relatively inexpensive credit tended to benefit 
wealthier borrowers while excluding microentrepreneurs and small and medium-
sized entrepreneurs (Ortiz, 1999; Vargas-Lundius, 1991). Distortions in the land 
market have contributed to this disequilibrium, lending to the persistence of extreme 
poverty in rural and primarily agricultural areas (Vargas-Lundius, 1991). For these 
and financial sustainability concerns, subsidized credit schemes largely failed in the 
Dominican Republic. 
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After a period of economic stagnation in the 1980’s, several financial 
institutions collapsed. Eight of 23 commercial banks in the country, together 
accounting for roughly 20 percent of banking assets, filed for bankruptcy between 
1988 and 1991. In 1989, over half of the country’s population was estimated as 
living in poverty (Cela, 1997). By 1990 inflation rates soared to 79.9% and GDP 
growth fell by 5.5 percent (CBDR, 2010). In response, the government began 
implementing sweeping financial reform. These measures included the liberalization 
of interest rates in 1991 (Rosario, 1998), and the adoption of new regulations 
beginning in 1992 that improved regulatory supervision to meet international 
transparency standards (Anderson & Valdes, 2008; McDonald & Ledgerwood, 
1999).  Ortiz (1999) concludes that this financial reform largely benefited 
microentrepreneurs as well as small and medium-sized business owners by 
abolishing inefficient subsidies.  
Individuals who are not currently incorporated into the formal financial 
sphere commonly depend upon moneylenders and rotating savings and credit 
associations (ROSCAs). Moneylenders have been generally documented as charging 
12-40% interest per month, rates that are too costly for the majority of Esperanza’s 
clients (Findley, 2005; Vargas-Lundius, 1991). The ROSCA system, referred to as a 
“san” or “san caliente” is common but extensive data on its workings is not readily 
available (Findley, 2005). In 1983, an estimated 30% of rural families participated in 
ROSCAs (Gielfus, 1994). 
 
2.4 Microfinance in the Dominican Republic  
In the Dominican Republic microfinance has offered an attractive alternative 
to borrowing informally and from traditional commercial banks among the extreme 
poor (Espinal & Grasmuck, 1997; McDonald & Ledgerwood, 1999).  Commercial 
and development banks, other regulated financial institutions, cooperatives and 
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savings and credit associations, non-governmental organizations, and government 
programs presently offer microfinance services (Findley, 2005). Microfinance in the 
country is more heavily geared towards microenterprise development but products 
have also been designed for small-scale agricultural operations, home improvement 
and/or construction, and general consumption needs (Findley, 2005). 
Within the Dominican Republic, Honohan (2008) finds that roughly 4.5 
million adults, or 71 percent of the adult population in 2005, did not have access to 
credit (Chai et. al, 2009). With respect to entrepreneurial prospects, a 2008 World 
Bank Report found that 13.3% of Dominican adults and firms are listed in public 
credit registries and 35.4% in private registries. This compares with respective 
averages of 8.6% and 59.3% among members of the Organization for Economic Co-
operation Development (OECD). The figures uphold the estimation that relatively 
fewer Dominican adults participate in the formal financial sphere. The Economist 
Intelligence Unit (2009) notes that the Dominican MFI market remains relatively less 
competitive than those of other Latin American countries. Taken together, these 
indicators suggest considerable prospects for the development of microfinance in the 
country. 
In the 1980s, several key non-governmental microfinance institutions were 
founded.  These included the Association for the Development of Microenterprises 
(ADEMI), the Dominican Association for the Women’s Development (ADOPEM), 
the Fund for Development (FONDESA), the Program for the Assistance of Small 
Firms, The Women’s Bank (Banco de la Mujer), and the Dominican Development 
Foundation (FDD). According to the Rating Fund (2008), a project pertaining to the 
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the Consultative Group to Assist the 
Poorest (CGAP), the FDD, FONDESA, ADOPEM, and ADEMI have since become 
the largest and most sustainable in the country. These MFI were remained relatively 
resilient during the economic crisis of the late 1980’s and early 1990’s. Among them, 
  15 
ADEMI notably thrived, removing subsidies in 1991 and eventually becoming a 
development bank.  These MFI exhibited an initial bias towards men but towards the 
end of the 1980s, incorporated a balanced count of women (Grasmuck, 2000).  
As of 2008, microfinance institutions in the Dominican Republic claimed a gross 
loan portfolio of roughly 1.9 million with 17,374 active borrowers and total assets of 
2.6 million (MIX Market, 2008). 
Of 55 countries included in an Economist Intelligence Unit 2009 
Microfinance index, the Dominican Republic ranked 22nd in terms of its investment 
climate, regulatory framework and institutional development overall. A 2009 ranking 
of the best MFI in Latin America and the Caribbean scored the Dominican 
Republic’s ADOPEM as 11th, and the country’s ADEMI as 60th (IADB, MIX Market 
& MIF, 2010).13 The report also notes that ADOPEM grew in size from 2007 to rank 
as the 20th largest Latin American MFI in terms of loan portfolio. The ADOPEM 
bank ranked 9th in terms of market saturation (IADB, MIX Market & MIF, 2010).14  
The measured interest rate proxy or microfinance ratio, suggests that interest 
rates among MFI in the Dominican Republic likely decreased between 2007 and 
2008 (EIU, 2009). Because all other Dominican financial institutions experienced an 
increase in mean interest rates during the period (Figure 4), it is not clear as to why 
this was the case.   
 
2.5 Partner Organization: Esperanza International   
Esperanza International is a non-profit faith-based MFI targeting the extreme 
poor in rural, semi-rural, and semi-urban communities of the Dominican Republic. 
The organization addresses gender disparities within the country by targeting 
                                                
13 229 MFI are considered in the ranking, data is limited to those that are listed at 
http://www.mixmarket.org 
14 IBID	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women. Esperanza was founded in 1995 by David Valle, a professional American 
baseball player who had trained in the Dominican Republic. Esperanza is affiliated 
with or has received funding from Hope International, Microsoft, the Grameen 
Foundation, the Dominican Institute of Telecommunications (INDOTEL), and the 
Seattle Mariners (Esperanza, 2010).   
As a Grameen Bank partner, Esperanza implements a derivative of the 
Grameen group solidarity-lending model. Group loans account for roughly 96 
percent of borrowers and 85 percent of the total loan portfolio. Clients convene on a 
biweekly basis with group members and an average of 5-10 other groups to repay 
loans within or in close proximity to their community of residence. As a component 
of a typical loan package, clients are required to make a set savings deposit per 
quota, and are offered the option of depositing additional voluntary savings. Clients 
are also offered the option of loan insurance and life insurance. At no additional cost, 
borrowers are offered certain basic Esperanza health services for themselves and 
their family members. At an extra cost of roughly US$1.50 per month, clients and 
their families can gain access to more specialized services in general medicine, 
rehabilitation, OBGYN, physical therapy, and HIV/AIDS testing & counseling 
(Esperanza, 2010).  
With a staff that is primarily Christian Pentecostal, as well as prayer and bible 
readings incorporated regularly into employee and client relations, Esperanza reflects 
the growing influence of fundamentalist Christian movements in the distribution of 
development funds (Harper, Rao & Sahu, 2008). Importantly, Esperanza does not 
exclude clients on the basis of religion. Eligibility for an Esperanza loan is currently 
based upon an individual’s source of income, income level, housing and living 
conditions, total assets, and socio-cultural development level. All potential associates 
must have some source of income, operate a microenterprise, or have evident 
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motivation to begin one. They must not, however, hold a fixed income higher than 
the national minimum salary for small businesses.  
 
Table 1 – Characteristics of Esperanza Loans 15 
 




Interest Rate, Annual 
Effective Interest Rate, Annual 
Installment, Days 
Amount disbursed, Pesos DR 8,876.60 16,623.46 
 
As of January 2010, Esperanza served 16,300 active clients with an average 
loan size of 8, 876 Pesos DR or roughly US$246.4716 for an average of six-month 
loan periods (Table 1). Esperanza offers a mean annual interest rate of 47 percent and 
a mean annual effective interest rate of 67 percent (Table 1). Esperanza additionally 
reports repayment rates of between 95 and 98 percent annually (Esperanza, 2010).  
 
 
                                                
15Represents 72,674 disbursed loans as of October, 2006 
16 Estimates are based on an average exchange rate of 36.11 Pesos DR per USD in January 2009, 
CBDR	  





3.1 Survey and Demand Supplement  
The survey was adapted from a survey developed by Cornell University and 
the Chinese Northwest Agriculture and Forestry University that assessed credit 
rationing issues as well as informal lending among friends and relatives among 
villagers in China (Appendix B). This survey or adaptations thereof have been 
administered in China and India between 2007 and 2009. The survey was adjusted to 
fit the participant-specific context in the Dominican Republic. It incorporated 
Esperanza employee input and also generally geared questions towards borrowers of 
a microfinance institution. An English version, Spanish translation, and back 
translation to English were all approved by the Cornell University Institutional 
Review Board for Human participants, and therefore abide by the university’s ethical 
standards. Esperanza reviewers made final and subtle adjustments in Spanish 
terminology and grammar. These alterations adjusted standard and formal Spanish 
phrases to the Spanish more commonly used among Esperanza clients. 
With a total of 14 interviewers, this study administered surveys to 431 
women and men that held primarily Esperanza group loans in July-August, 2009.17 
Of these, 257 provided complete survey data and 229 of these can be linked to loan 
and client data contained in Esperanza’s database. The six Esperanza branches of 
Puerto Plata, Los Guaricanos, Los Alcarrizos, San Pedro de Macoris, Hato Mayor, 
and el Seybo were included in this analysis (Figure 1). Three Esperanza branches 
                                                
17 Interviewers were asked to only in interview women with group loans. This however was 
misunderstood in some cases. As a result, there are a small number of men and participants with 
individual loans in the survey sample.   
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were excluded from the study.18 Interviewers were Esperanza volunteers or 
employees, and attended a training session before implementation as well as an 
organized post-survey discussion. Participants were asked for demographic, 
borrowing, lending, savings and investment information, and were also asked to 
respond to a series of eight demand questions (Figure 2).  
In selecting participants, interviewers attended scheduled bank meetings or 
traveled to communities where clients were known to live. At scheduled bank 
meetings, interviewers administered surveys to clients that were willing to be 
interviewed. Interviewers determined which bank meetings to participate in 
according to scheduling restrictions. Some of the scheduled bank meetings took 
place at Esperanza’s branch offices. If clients were interviewed outside of scheduled 
bank meetings, interviewers identified participant communities according to travel 
limitations and suggestions offered by loan officer. 
Interviewers at the el Seybo and San Pedro de Macoris branches were given a 
goal of collecting 100 surveys per branch. The three interviewers operating out of the 
Santo Domingo offices were given the goal of collecting 50 surveys in total. The 
interviewer operating out of the Hato Mayor office was given a goal of collecting 50 
interviews. These goals were determined according to interviewer time limitations. 
An additional five interviewers traveled between branches to support and monitor all 
surveying.  
Selected descriptive statistics for the full sample of 257 and subsample of 229 
are presented (Table 2; Appendices A.1 –A.2). We find that on average participants 
completed some or all of a high school education, have taken out an actual loan of 
                                                
18  Interviews were not conducted in Samana as a result of internal managerial problems. Interviews 
were not conducted in Santiago as a result of its relatively new status, disproportionate representation 
of urban clients, and lack of available volunteers and employees to administer surveys.  
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11445.41 Pesos DR for 6.3 months, and have received 5.6 loans from any lender 
prior to the survey.  
 
Table 2 – Client Descriptive Statistics, Key Variables 
 






Education, 1(Illiterate)-7(Completed College) 3.19 1.44 3.20 1.43 
Number of Dependents in Elementary School 1.53 1.43 1.52 1.46 
Access to Water (3=always, 2=sometimes, 1=never) 2.17 0.89 2.17 0.90 
Religious Rating, 1(Not Religious)-8(Very Religious) 5.72 2.27 5.71 2.23 
Community Involvement, 1(Always)-4(Never) 2.09 1.09 2.10 1.10 
Actual Loan, When Surveyed (Pesos DR) 11445.41 6681.53 11445.41 6681.53 
Actual Loan Term, When Surveyed (Days) 189.55 62.17 189.55 62.17 
Actual Voluntary Savings Total, When Surveyed (Pesos DR) 40.02 18.96 40.02 18.96 
Num. Loans After Cornell Survey 0.80 0.57 0.83 0.57 
Sum of Esperanza Loans Before Cornell Survey (Pesos DR) 27593.34 26271.76 29071.11 27062.52 
Number of Loans Received, All Lenders 5.57 4.02 5.74 4.08 
Debt Level, 1(Low)-3(High) 1.65 0.57 1.66 0.57 
Credit Rationing Esperanza, 1(Strongly Disagree)-5(Strongly 
Agree) 2.01 1.59 1.99 1.59 
Credit Rationing Consumption,1(Disagree)-5(Strongly 
Agree) 1.80 1.35 1.79 1.35 
Credit Rationing Business,1(Disagree)-5(Strongly Agree) 4.17 1.42 4.15 1.46 
Risk, 1(Risk Averse)-5(Risk Seeking) 3.96 1.65 3.89 1.70 
Difference b/w Actual and Variant Loans (Pesos DR) 2672.55 5974.00 2896.93 6188.60 
Time Between Esperanza and Cornell Surveys (Months) 1.04 5.97 0.16 4.22 
Variant Loan Length (Months) 6.02 0.47 6.01 0.48 
 
We presented the demand supplement 10 to 20 minutes into the survey to 
assure that clients were not excessively exhausted. In this supplement, two treatments 
put forward interest rates that increased or decreased sequentially by 1 percent per 
month from 0 to 8 percent and 8 to 0 percent respectively. In consideration of mean 
Esperanza loan characteristics (Table 1) a 4 percent monthly interest rate and six 
month term were chosen for the base loan rate and term in these eight demand 
questions. 
No question was included for the base loan rate of 4%, as the acceptance of 
this loan was assumed. With each interest rate change, clients were then offered 10 
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to15 loan options, all of which they were asked to acknowledge with Yes/No 
selections. These loan options correspond with elasticities of 0, -0.1, -0.2, -0.3, -0.4, -
0.5, -0.6, -0.7, -0.8, -0.9, -1.0, -1.25, -1.5, -1.75, and -2.0 where applicable. As a 
result, loan sizes increase from the base loan amount as the interest rate decreases 
and decrease from the base loan amount as the interest rate increases.  
 
 
Interviewer: All of the following questions ask the client to respond supposing that they have 
a loan of 6000 Pesos DR for 6 Months. 
1) Suppose that you have received a loan of 6000 Pesos DR for 6 months. Now suppose 
that the interest rate increased from 4 percent to 8 percent per month, or 96 percent annual. This 
means that you would pay roughly 120 Pesos MORE per quota. With this interest rate, and 
using the money for exactly what you indicated earlier, which of the following loans would you 




















0 A $6,000 $649 $1848   
-0.1 B $5,400 $585 $1661   
-0.2 C $4,800 $520 $1477   
-0.3 D $4,200 $455 $1292   
-0.4 E $3,600 $390 $1108   
-0.5 F $3,000 $325 $924   
-0.6 G $2,400 $260 $737   
-0.7 H $1,800 $195 $553   
-0.8 I $1,200 $130 $368   
-0.9 J $600 $65 $184   
 
Figure 8. Demand Supplement, English Translation of a Sample Question 
 
Where a client has chosen a series of loans and makes only one switch from 
“yes” to “no,” we have used the average of the elasticities that correspond to the loan 
and next unselected loan to calculate a final loan size. In cases where clients have 
selected “yes” for all loans, the maximum loan amount has been included in the 
demand analysis. Where clients have selected multiple non-sequential loans, we have 
included only the loan where they have made their first switch. Where clients have 
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selected “no” for all loan options in a question, it has been assumed that they would 
borrow a loan size of zero.  
To address anchoring concerns and capture a probable range of client loans, 
we administered five variants. These calculated interest rate changes according to 
base loan amounts of 3000, 6000, 9000, 12,000, or 15,000 Pesos DR, the equivalent 
of US$84, US$167, US$251, US$334, or US$417 respectively.19 Interviewers 
carried multiple variants, and were asked to select the loan that best matched the 
clients’ actual loan. Clients were asked to envision using the hypothetical loans for 
the same purpose(s) that they used or were using their current Esperanza loan.  
As compensation for their participation in the survey, clients were each 
offered a bundle valued at roughly US$4.00 that included three to four school 
notebooks, one tube of toothpaste, one small bag of laundry detergent, and one bar of 
soap.  
Before surveying began, 11 Interviewers participated in a full day training 
session. This session included a full group read-through of the survey where 
interviewers were encouraged to share their concerns.  After surveying began 2 
additional interviewers were incorporated into the team. So as to introduce these 
interviewers to the survey, they were asked to observe a survey session and discuss 
confusing points or to administer a survey while a trained interviewer observed and 
guided them through questions.   
                                                
19	  Estimates are based on an average exchange rate of 35.886 Pesos DR per USD in 2009, CBDR	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Chapter 4 
DEMAND & ELASTICITY MEASURES 
 
4.1 Demand and Elasticity Data 
Credit demand curves have been constructed for each client and as theory 
predicts, generally slope downwards (Figure 9; Figure 10). That is, demand for credit 
generally increases as the interest rates decreases towards zero. These findings 
corroborate those of Turvey (2010) among 897 small-scale farmers in China in 2009. 
Five selected demand curves highlight heterogeneity in participant preferences 
(Figure 11).  
 
 




                                                
20 Desired loan with each interest rate change is displayed, N=229. Entries at the 4 % level are base 
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Figure 11. Selected Demand Curves – Subsample 
 
Within the sample, demand for microcredit becomes more elastic as the 
interest rates fall and more inelastic as interest rates increase (Table 3).  This is to say 
that clients are more responsive to a decrease in the interest rate than they are to a 
decrease in the interest rate. Table 3 also indicates that mean elasticity values are 
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In other words, the mean elasticities of the subsample seem to be representative of 
the larger sample.  
 
Table 3 – Mean of Raw Elasticity Measures, Full Sample and Subsample 
 
    Monthly Interest Rate    
 0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 
Full Sample -1.33 -1.24 -1.15 -0.94 (Base Loan) -1.26 -0.81 -0.66 -0.55 
Subsample -1.33 -1.26 -1.17 -0.94 (Base Loan) -1.26 -0.82 -0.67 -0.55 
           
  
 
The range of raw elasticities is graphically displayed in Figure 12 for the 
subsample of 229 clients. Elasticity measures greater than zero or less than -2 are 
drawn from clients who have selected “No” for all loans in a given question. These 
elasticity calculations therefore correlate with loan sizes of zero, which lie outside 
the original loan size restrictions.  
 
Figure 12. Raw Elasticities of Demand for Credit – Subsample 21 
 
 
                                                
21 Selected elasticities correlate with loan selections made in the demand supplement N=229. Demand 
elasticities at the 4% base loan level represent the mean of the elasticities at the 3% and 5% levels.  
Outliers (e>0 or e<-2) are cases where clients have selected "No" for all loan options and a loan 
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4.2 Best-fit Elasticity Measure 
A “best-fit” elasticity measure is derived from linear and constant elasticity of 
demand functions that have been fitted to the raw loan demand data. Elasticity is 










with L  representing the quantity of loan demanded and i representing the interest 
rate.  
The linear demand function is, 
€ 
L = B − Ai , where B is the intercept, A is the 
slope and i is the interest rate. The elasticity is derived at the base interest rate with, 













The constant elasticity demand function is, 
€ 
L = Biε  where L is the quantity of 
loan demanded, D is a positive constant, i is the interest rate, and εC is constant 
elasticity. With a logarithmic transformation of the selected loan amounts, we extract 
the slope, A, and calculate elasticity as, 
€ 
εC = A .22  
We evaluate R2 values for each linear and constant-elasticity demand function 
and accordingly select a best-fit function for each client. The linear demand elasticity 
measures produced greater R2 values than constant elasticity measures in 235, or 




                                                
22 Because constant elasticity demand functions approach zero at but do not intersect with the y-axis, 
loan entries of zero are substituted with values of 0.001.  
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Figure 13. Linear, Best-Fit and Constant Elasticity Measures – Subsample 23 
 
 
Finally we estimate a mean best-fit elasticity of -0.91 (Table 4, Table 5). 
When measured by branch, mean best-fit elasticities vary considerably (Table 5). For 
example, a mean of -1.27 among 56 participants in Hato Mayor compares with a 
mean of -0.63 among 71 participants in San Pedro de Macoris. Further measurements 
confirm that the Hato Mayor (p<0.01) and Seybo (p<0.01) elasticity measures are 
skewed (Table 5). This abnormality may result from sampling error and requires 




                                                
23 Notes: Cumulative counts of point elasticity estimates at base loan and interest rate of 4% monthly 
derived from linear function, constant elasticity power function, and a “best-fit” 













Linear Elasticity Best-Fit Elasticity Constant Elasticity 
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Table 4 – Best-fit, Linear, and Constant Elasticity Measures  
 






“Best-fit” Elasticity Measure -0.91 0.51 -0.92 0.51 
Linear Elasticity -0.95 0.47 -0.96 0.48 
Constant Elasticity -0.49 0.66 -0.49 0.66 
 
 
Table 5 – Mean of “Best-fit” Elasticity by Branch 
 
Branch Observations Mean 
Standard  




Hato Mayor 56 -1.27 0.54 -1.67 -0.05 0.00 
San Pedro de 
Macoris 71 -0.63 0.42 -1.48 -0.04 0.44 
Los 
Alcarrizos 13 -0.92 0.38 -1.65 -0.33 0.72 
Los 
Guaricanos 9 -0.78 0.59 -1.67 -0.13 0.76 
Puerto Plata 20 -0.39 0.36 -1.01 -0.03 0.25 
El Seybo 88 -1.04 0.37 -1.58 -0.07 0.00 
Total 257 -0.91 0.51 -1.67 -0.03 0.22 
 
 
4.3 Discussion of Demand and Elasticity Findings  
Survey complexity (Simon, 1955), framing (Slovic, 1969; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1981), and ambivalence resulting from cognitive dissonance (Akerlof, 
1982) may explain inconsistencies with neoclassical demand theory. However, the 
sample’s single upward sloping demand curve (Figure 11) may also explained by the 
inherent limitations of the survey’s design.  
The featured demand preferences belong to a client who held an actual 
Esperanza loan of 8,000 Pesos DR, but who was presented with a variant loan size of 
10,000 Pesos DR in the Demand Supplement. The client’s actual loan and accrued 
interest totaled at 9516 Pesos DR. Because presented loan options were bound by 
elasticities of 0 to -2, the smallest loan offered as the interest rates decreased was a 
loan of 10,000 Pesos DR. Assuming that the client is not credit rationed, it is possible 
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that they would prefer a loan smaller than 10,000 Pesos DR but not equal to zero as 
was inferred by their response of “No” to all loan options. Indeed, the demand curve 
in this instance slopes downward after the client is provided with options that include 
8000 Pesos DR.  
Interestingly, raw mean elasticity jumps between 3 and 5 percent, disrupting 
continuity between zero and 8 percent (Table 3). This result is likely explained by 
complexity and framing issues (Slovic, 1969; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). That is, 
clients may have had difficulty in framing the base loan and rate, and in responding 
consistently to increases and decreases surrounding that base rate. 
Cases where the elasticity ranges into the positive (Figure 12) are also 
violations of neoclassical demand theory. These elasticities are consistent with the 
upward sloping nature of select portions of demand curves (Figure 9; Figure 11) and 
with the disruptions in continuity reflected by mean raw elasticity values (Table 3). 
Our mean elasticity estimate falls within the range defined by Dehejia et al 
(2007) among MFI borrowers in Bangladesh of -0.73 to -1.04. However, the finding 
contrasts Bell et al.’s (1997) measure of -0.22 among small-scale farmers in Punjab, 
India. Our raw elasticity estimate of -0.55 at 8 percent interest per month (Table 3) 
contrasts Karlan et. al.’s (2008) more inelastic estimation of -0.32 at an interest rate 
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Table 6 – Change in Interest Rate Revenue According to Loan Selections, Full 
Sample 24 
 
A revenue analysis of the loan selections indicates that Esperanza would not 
gain interest revenue within the sample by changing interest rates (Table 6). In other 
words, Esperanza has modeled interest rates optimally. Reflecting upon the variation 
in mean raw elasticities (Table 3), Table 6 illustrates that Esperanza would lose more 
revenue within the sample by decreasing their interest rates than they would by 
increasing interest rates. However, this analysis has not considered changes in 
demand for microcredit among potential future clients. As a result, it is not clear how 








                                                
24 Estimates compound interest on a biweekly basis and are measured according to interest rate 
revenue assumed for variant base loan.	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Chapter 5 
ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
5.1 Econometric Analysis  
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and tobit models are considered in this 
analysis. The models regress best-fit elasticity measures against demographic, loan 
and business characteristics, borrowing behavior, savings, as well as controls for 
survey design and implementation. The OLS model is represented as,  
€ 
εB = Βo +Β1x1 + ...+Β j x j + e  
Given that we have bound elasticity measures between 0 and -2, the data may 
be censored. When an OLS regression is used to estimate relationships with censored 
data, the estimator will emerge as inconsistent. The tobit model on the other hand 
produces a consistent estimator in these cases (Amemiya, 1973). For this reason, 
OLS results are compared with those of a tobit model.  
Concerns surrounding interviewer consistency are addressed by removing 
interviewer dummy variables in both the OLS and tobit regressions.  
 
5.2 Ordinary Least Squares and Tobit Regressions  
Columns 1 and 3 present OLS and Tobit regressions that incorporate a 
complete set of independent variables. OLS and Tobit regressions that exclude 
interviewer dummy variables are presented in Columns 2 and 4 respectively. All 
written results consider the OLS regression presented in Column 1 of Table 7 unless 
otherwise indicated.  
 
  32 
Table 7– Ordinary Least Squares and Tobit Regressions, Key Variables 25 
 
  OLS Regressions Tobit Regressions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Vocational Training 0.189* 0.198* 0.189** 0.198** 
 (0.082) (0.079) (0.067) (0.067) 
Haitian Relatives -0.141 -0.184 -0.141 -0.184* 
 (0.106) (0.099) (0.087) (0.085) 
Primary Income,Wage Labor -0.365* -0.344* -0.365** -0.344** 
 (0.146) (0.137) (0.119) (0.117) 
Monthly Sales, 0-5000 Pesos DR -0.332** -0.306* -0.332*** -0.306** 
 (0.120) (0.119) (0.098) (0.102) 
Credit Rationing Consumption, 1(Disagree)-
5(Strongly Agree)  -0.052* -0.054* -0.052* -0.054** 
 (0.025) (0.023) (0.020) (0.019) 
Risk, 1(Risk Averse)-5(Risk Seeking) 0.035* 0.040* 0.035* 0.040** 
 (0.018) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) 
Loan Purpose, Productive Inputs 0.17 0.177 0.170* 0.177* 
 (0.100) (0.097) (0.082) (0.083) 
Interest Rate Aware -0.134 -0.137 -0.134* -0.137* 
 (0.078) (0.074) (0.064) (0.063) 
If Rate Decreased, Borrow More 0.246** 0.231** 0.246*** 0.231*** 
 (0.081) (0.079) (0.066) (0.067) 
If Rate Decreased, Borrow Less -0.354 -0.208 -0.354* -0.208 
 (0.195) (0.183) (0.159) (0.156) 
Difference b/w Actual and Variant Loans 0.000* 0.000* 0.000** 0.000* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Answered "No" to All Loan Options 0.629*** 0.648*** 0.629*** 0.648*** 
 (0.108) (0.097) (0.088) (0.082) 
Branch, Hato Mayor -0.576 -0.208 -0.576* -0.208 
 (0.296) (0.129) (0.242) (0.110) 
Branch, Guaricanos -0.295 -0.429 -0.295 -0.429* 
 (0.440) (0.239) (0.359) (0.204) 
Branch, Puerto Plata -0.4 -0.421** -0.4 -0.421** 
 (0.567) (0.158) (0.463) (0.135) 
Constant 1.032 1.117 1.032 1.117 
 (1.471) (1.348) (1.201) (1.149) 
Sigma Constant   0.273*** 0.291*** 
      (0.014) (0.015) 
Observations  198 198 198 198 
a. Demographic  Characteristics 
Among demographic variables, clients who held vocational training emerged with 
significantly more elastic demand than clients who did not (p<0.10). The significance 
                                                
25 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is best-fit 
elasticity estimate. Full regression is presented in Appendix A.3 as well and variable descriptions in 
Appendix A.5 
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of this variable increased in the tobit models (p<0.05). Clients who drew the majority 
of their income from wage labor show significantly more inelastic demand than 
clients who gathered the majority of their income from remittances or who did not 
have a regular income source (p<0.05). When interviewers were removed and the 
tobit model was applied (Col. 4), clients who reported having Haitian relatives 
emerged with significantly more inelastic demand (p<0.05). Neither religiosity nor 
perceived community involvement emerge as significant in this model. 
b. Loan Characteristics 
The clients' actual loan size, installment, effective interest rate and amount 
placed into a voluntary savings account during the course of the loan did not emerge 
as significant.  
c. Business Characteristics 
Clients who reported monthly sales of zero to 5000 Pesos DR emerged with 
significantly more inelastic demand than clients that were still in the midst of 
establishing their business and could not yet claim regular sales (p<0.05). The 
variables emerged with higher levels of significance in the tobit models. Clients who 
invested any portion of their actual Esperanza loan in productive inputs emerged 
with more elastic demand (p<0.10) in the tobit models.   
d. Borrowing Behavior 
Clients who reported that they were more likely to take risks in order to 
increase profits carried significantly more elastic demand (p<0.10). Clients who 
considered themselves credit rationed with regards to consumption displayed more 
inelastic demand (p<0.1) than those who did not. In both tobit models (Col. 3, Col. 
4), clients that were familiar enough with the concept of an interest rate to give any 
response regarding the rate on their current loan emerged with significantly more 
inelastic demand (p<0.10). 
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When asked how they would respond if the interest rate on their loan 
increased, clients who would take out a smaller loan emerged with less elastic 
demand than clients who would take out the same loan or who did not know 
(p<0.10). Clients who would take out a larger loan if the rate increased emerged with 
significantly more elastic demand (p<0.05). In the full tobit model (Col. 3) clients 
who would take out a smaller loan if the rate decreased emerged with significantly 
more inelastic demand (p<0.10) than those who would take out the same loan or who 
did not know.  
The sum of Esperanza loans disbursed prior to the survey emerged as 
significant variables. The number of loans that participants received from banks or 
NGO prior to the survey was also insignificant. Clients who reported that they had at 
least once been late to repay a loan to a family member, friend, moneylender or 
formal financial institution did not emerge as significantly different from zero in the 
models.  
e. Savings 
Savings variables did not emerge as significant in the model.  
f. Survey Control Variables 
The difference in size between the clients' actual loans and the variant loans 
emerged as significant (p<0.05), but with a coefficient of 0.000. Clients who 
responded “No” to all loan options in any given question emerged with significantly 
more elastic demand (p<0.01).  
When interviewer dummies are removed, clients from the Puerto Plata branch 
carried significantly more inelastic demand than those from el Seybo (p<0.05). In the 
full tobit model, borrowers from the Hato Mayor branch emerged with significantly 
more inelastic demand than those from el Seybo (p<0.10). When interviewer 
dummies are removed (Col. 4), clients from Los Guaricanos (p<0.01) and from 
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Puerto Plata (p<0.05) emerged as significant. Variant size and the demand instrument 
control did not emerge as significant. 
 
5.3 Robustness Check  
Esperanza survey data was drawn from the Esperanza survey that had been 
administered closest to the Cornell survey date. This data includes the vocational 
training, estimated savings, and monthly business sale data. In some cases, this 
Esperanza survey data was collected after the Cornell survey date. In consideration 
of endogeneity concerns, these observations are dropped in a robustness check of the 
OLS and tobit models (Appendix A.4). 
 
5.4 Discussion of Regression Models  
Variables relating to entrepreneurial drive and skill-level emerge with a 
positive correlation to elasticity. These variables include vocational training and 
decreased risk aversion when increasing profits. Boucher and Carter (2001) describe 
a theoretical model that ties endowments with entrepreneurial success and posits that 
rationing perpetuates these inequalities. As this intuitive model suggests, further 
understanding of entrepreneurial drive as it relates to credit demand and endowment 
is warranted.  
Though significance levels are not consistent, coefficient estimates also 
indicate that clients who source the majority of their income from wage labor display 
more inelastic demand than those who source the majority of their income from their 
own business. This would further link entrepreneurial drive to more elastic demand. 
The variable, however, also places borrowers who rely upon remittances or whose 
  36 
income is not regular as most elastic. An interpretation of this full relationship 
requires further study.  
Monthly business sales variables also provide partially confounding results. 
That is, individuals operating in the lowest sales bracket exhibit significantly more 
inelastic demand than individuals who have not yet established a business. 
Coefficients representing greater monthly sales brackets however, show that 
elasticity increases as sales increase. This may be reasonably linked to 
entrepreneurial drive and to the substitution of assets for credit. The robustness check 
(Appendix A.4) confirms that monthly business sales is significantly and negatively 
correlated with zero even when Esperanza survey data is restricted to those collected 
prior to the survey. Overall, the results call for more careful understanding of 
business development, the borrowing behavior of clients who have recently entered 
Esperanza, and business sales.  
Though variables did not emerge as significant, the coefficient signs of the 
savings variables corroborate Dehejia et. al.’s (2007) elasticity estimations of -0.86 
for a “low-saving” group and -0.26 for a “high-saving” group. However, Dehejia et 
al (2007) base their estimations on a measure of voluntary savings that the client set 
aside over the course of their loan in a monitored bank account. The same voluntary 
savings variable did not surface as statistically different from zero in the presented 
regressions (Table 7) and held a slightly negative coefficient in all four considered 
models.  
Variables that would feasibly correlate with financial literacy and rationing 
emerge as inversely correlated with elasticity. These are an ability to name the 
interest rate on the client’s Esperanza loan and the perceived degree of consumer 
credit rationing. The credit rationing results confirm the intuitive understanding that 
credit rationed individuals are less responsive to changes in interest rates. 
Nevertheless, it is not clear why other business-specific credit rationing questions did 
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not also emerge as significant in the model. The implications of these results are not 
fully clear, and require further analysis.  
We find that Dominican-Haitians exhibit significantly more inelastic demand 
for credit in one of the incorporated models. This finding may correlate with degrees 
of credit rationing or levels of wealth. Dominican Haitians comprise what are 
relatively the most impoverished communities in the Dominican Republic, 
commonly living isolated in relic sugarcane producing communities. All surveyed 
clients were fluent in Spanish, but Haitian cultural ties may in some way limit 
investment or financial opportunities. There is also a deeply rooted aversion to 
Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian decent. This hostility finds its roots in the 
Haitian raids of the 19th century and continues to propagate with cultural and 
economic tension (Vargas-Lundius, 1991). 
Though several studies have linked religious identity with economic 
indicators (Barro & McCleary, 2006; Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2003) , 
religious self-identification did not emerge as significantly different from zero in the 
models. This supports the findings of Benjamin et. al. (2010) in their study of 827 
college students. In order to discern time preferences and the valuation of money, 
subjects were posed with payment scenarios,26 with no significant differences 
emerging between Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish students (Benjamin et. al., 2010).  
Questions meant to gauge basic responses to interest rate changes are 
significant and consistent with expectations. Clients who would borrow more if their 
rate decreased, show more elastic demand than those who would take out the same 
loan or did not know. When asked how they would respond if the interest rate on 
their loan increased, clients who would take out a smaller loan emerged with less 
                                                
26 The authors asked participants to make 12 choices of yes or no between receiving $10 immediately 
and receiving some larger sum a week later. Participants were also asked to make another 12 choices 
between receiving $10 one week later and receiving a larger sum roughly two weeks into the future. 
The larger sums ranged from $10.10 to $15.  
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elastic demand than clients who would take out the same loan or who did not know. 
These findings compliment the trend outlined in Table 3 with mean raw elasticity 
estimates. These show an increase in elasticity as interest rates decline and decrease 
in elasticity as interest rates increase.  
Clients who would take out a smaller loan if the rate decreased display 
significantly more inelastic demand. This result violates demand theory and may find 
its explanation in problems of complexity (Simon, 1955) or framing (Slovic, 1969; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). 
Clients who selected “No” for all loan options in any one of the eight demand 
questions, are correlated with more elastic demand. Coding these responses with loan 
sizes of zero may excessively skew elasticity estimates, and consequently call for the 
calculation of appropriate non-zero loan sizes.  
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Chapter 6 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
6.1 Further Considerations 
Certain demand data were simplified for the purpose of this study. These 
include roughly 12 clients who made multiple switches from “yes” to “no” within 
any single loan question. These unique preferences warrant further investigation as a 
full explanation may expose survey design flaws or define unknown aspects of 
demand among clients.  
Macroeconomic indicators such as inflation have been shown to influence 
investment behavior among microentrepreneurs in the Dominican Republic (Fischer, 
2008). Such indicators alter the value of a loan and may link intricately with 
elasticity of demand measures. Future analysis may therefore benefit from careful 
consideration of such macroeconomic fluctuations.   
Because study participants were clients who had already agreed to 
Esperanza’s loan terms, their preferences are not necessarily representative of the 
wider market for microcredit in the Dominican Republic. It is recommended that 
future analyses consider microcredit borrowers outside of Esperanza.   
 
6.2 Policy Responses  
Appropriate policy measures remain debatable regionally and worldwide. Of 
136 surveyed countries globally, 39 have instated usury limits (CGAP, 2009). 
Interest rate ceilings have been considered a measure in consumer protection, but 
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evidence shows that they can also inhibit the growth of pro-poor MFI (MIX Market, 
2009). An analysis of Mexican MFI by MIX Market (2009) finds that interest rate 
ceilings limit access to credit among the poor by marking smaller sized loans as 
uneconomical. Similar findings have been reported in relation to South Africa’s 
blanket MFI price ceilings of the 1990’s (Whitaker, 2008). 
With short-term subsidies targeted at women borrowers for instance, some 
argue that MFI could lower their interest rates, increase their capital base, grow to a 
larger scale, and more sustainably serve a larger number of clients (Ortiz, 1999). 
However, credit subsidies in the Dominican Republic and other similar economies 
have not been historically successful (Adams & Von Pischke, 1992; Ortiz, 1999).  
Reflecting upon the development of microfinance in the Dominican Republic 
between the 1980’s and the late 1990’s, Ortiz (1999) argues that in order to achieve 
greater impact and meet remaining demand in the Dominican Republic, MFI must 
work to attract more private sector capital. Ortiz (1999) notes that the creation of the 
country’s Small Business Bank S.A. and the transformation of ADEMI into a 
Development Bank were the first significant strides made in this effort.  
Appropriate measures will become more apparent as demand is more 
precisely defined. This will require further study of MFI borrowers as well as all 
individuals who currently borrow outside of the formal banking sphere.  
 
6.3 Conclusions 
Although MFI are growing at a considerable rate in developing economies, 
the demand for microcredit remains largely undefined within the relevant literature. 
This study contributes to the understanding of this demand and to the development of 
future analyses. To accomplish such, this thesis has defined two key objectives.  
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The first of these objectives has been to estimate microcredit demand and 
price elasticity of demand among a sample of MFI borrowers. The study has derived 
estimates from individual loan demand information collected by the author and a 
team of interviewers in the Dominican Republic. This study concludes that the 
sampled microentrepreneurs exhibit downward sloping and largely linear demand for 
microcredit. Moreover, we find that the sampled microentrepreneurs exhibit close to 
unit elastic demand for microcredit at the rate of 4 percent per month. More plainly, 
we find that from this base rate the percentage change in the interest rate is met by 
nearly the same percentage change in the loan size demanded.  These findings 
suggest that interest rate changes would not generate additional revenue for 
Esperanza, and that the MFI has successfully modeled interest rates.  
The second objective of this study has been to determine the endogenous 
factors that are correlated with this microcredit demand and with the corresponding 
price elasticity of demand. In achieving this, the study has employed OLS and tobit 
models to regress best-fit elasticity estimates against demographic characteristics as 
well as borrowing and investment behavior. The study finds that variables correlated 
with entrepreneurial drive and skill level are positively correlated with elasticity. 
Results also find that financial literacy and access is negatively correlated with 
elasticity.  
The results of this unique study suggest that the demand for microcredit 
within the Dominican Republic is more elastic than has been estimated in other 
regions of the world. Further analysis of the borrower-lender relationship will be 
necessary in successfully designing efficient and appropriate financial products and 
public policy in the country.  
 
  42 
 
APPENDIX A 
Descriptive Statistics, Regression Analyses & Variable Key  
 
A.1:  Client Descriptive Statistics (Percent) 






Vocational Training  0.68 0.47 0.70 0.46 
Haitian Relatives  0.15 0.36 0.14 0.35 
Primary Income, Own Business  0.80 0.40 0.79 0.40 
Primary Income, Wage Labor   0.14 0.35 0.14 0.35 
Primary Income Source, Not Regular   0.01 0.09 0.01 0.09 
Primary Income Source, Remittances   0.05 0.22 0.05 0.22 
Annual Savings, 0-5% of Income   0.51 0.50 0.50 0.50 
Annual Savings, 5-10% of Income   0.67 0.95 0.70 0.96 
Annual Savings, More than 10% of Income   0.14 0.35 0.14 0.35 
Savings, 0-500 Pesos DR   0.29 0.46 0.27 0.45 
Savings, 500-1000 Pesos DR   0.30 0.46 0.31 0.46 
Actual Effective Annual Interest Rate, When 
Surveyed  65.38 7.72 65.38 7.72 
Esperanza Health Services   0.80 0.40 0.80 0.40 
Loan Purpose, Productive Inputs   0.10 0.30 0.10 0.30 
Monthly Sales, Not Applicable   0.10 0.30 0.08 0.28 
Monthly Sales, 0-5000 (Pesos DR)   0.22 0.41 0.22 0.42 
Monthly Sales, 5000-10000 Pesos DR   0.25 0.43 0.26 0.44 
Monthly Sales, 10000-15000 Pesos DR   0.24 0.43 0.24 0.43 
Monthly Sales, 15000-20000 Pesos DR   0.16 0.36 0.16 0.36 
Monthly Sales, 20000 or more Pesos DR   0.04 0.19 0.04 0.19 
Debt Outside of Esperanza    0.34 0.47 0.34 0.48 
Loan History, Late Repayment any Lender    0.22 0.42 0.22 0.42 
Credit Necessary to Purchase Sufficient Food   0.35 0.48 0.34 0.47 
Interest Rate Aware    0.39 0.49 0.37 0.48 
If Rate Increased, Borrow More   0.10 0.30 0.09 0.29 
If Rate Increased, Borrow Same   0.40 0.49 0.39 0.49 
If Rate Increased, Borrow Less   0.42 0.49 0.44 0.50 
If Rate Decreased, Borrow More   0.81 0.39 0.81 0.39 
If Rate Decreased, Borrow Same   0.14 0.35 0.14 0.35 
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A.2: Client Descriptive Statistics, Survey Controls (Percent) 






Survey Treatment A   0.60 0.49 0.61 0.49 
Surveyed at Bank Meeting   0.12 0.32 0.11 0.32 
Answered "No" to All Loan 
Options   0.24 0.43 0.24 0.43 
Individual Loan     0.07 0.26 0.08 0.27 
Man    0.02 0.12 0.01 0.09 
Branch, Hato Mayor   0.22 0.41 0.22 0.41 
Branch, San Pedro de Macoris   0.28 0.45 0.29 0.45 
Branch, Alcarrizos   0.05 0.22 0.04 0.20 
Branch, Guaricanos   0.04 0.18 0.03 0.16 
Branch, Puerto Plata   0.08 0.27 0.07 0.25 
Interviewer, Mirna   0.09 0.29 0.10 0.30 
Interviewer, Astia   0.21 0.41 0.22 0.41 
Interviewer, Lourdes   0.07 0.25 0.06 0.23 
Interviewer, Emmanuel   0.00 0.06 0.00 0.07 
Interviewer, Esmeida   0.14 0.35 0.14 0.35 
Interviewer, Gabriela   0.04 0.20 0.04 0.20 
Interviewer, Maira   0.05 0.21 0.05 0.22 
Interviewer, Maximo   0.04 0.19 0.04 0.19 
Interviewer, Miguelina   0.00 0.06 0.00 0.07 
Interviewer, MiguelinaArrendel   0.02 0.12 0.02 0.13 
Interviewer, Reina   0.19 0.39 0.19 0.39 
Interviewer, Yrene   0.05 0.21 0.04 0.19 
Interviewer, Fabia   0.03 0.16 0.03 0.16 
Interviewer, Anastasia   0.08 0.27 0.07 0.25 
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A.3: Elasticity of Demand for Credit, OLS and Tobit Estimates, Full Models 
  OLS Regresssions  Tobit Regressions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Age 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Education, 1(Illiterate)-7(Completed 
College) 0.024 0.036 0.024 0.036 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.020) (0.020) 
Vocational Training 0.189* 0.198* 0.189** 0.198** 
 (0.082) (0.079) (0.067) (0.067) 
Dependents in Elementary School -0.013 -0.002 -0.013 -0.002 
 (0.021) (0.020) (0.017) (0.017) 
Access to Water -0.023 -0.026 -0.023 -0.026 
 (0.035) (0.034) (0.028) (0.029) 
Haitian Relatives -0.141 -0.184 -0.141 -0.184* 
 (0.106) (0.099) (0.087) (0.085) 
Primary Income, Own Business -0.182 -0.132 -0.182 -0.132 
 (0.124) (0.119) (0.101) (0.102) 
Primary Income, Wage Labor -0.365* -0.344* -0.365** -0.344** 
 (0.146) (0.137) (0.119) (0.117) 
Annual Savings, 0-5% of Income -0.113 -0.032 -0.113 -0.032 
 (0.100) (0.096) (0.081) (0.082) 
Annual Savings, 5-10% of Income -0.05 -0.032 -0.05 -0.032 
 (0.046) (0.045) (0.037) (0.038) 
Savings, 0-500 Pesos DR -0.057 -0.03 -0.057 -0.03 
 (0.089) (0.087) (0.073) (0.074) 
Savings, 500-1000 Pesos DR 0.09 0.111 0.09 0.111 
 (0.079) (0.078) (0.064) (0.066) 
Religious Rating, 1(Not Religious)-8(Very 
Religious) -0.014 -0.011 -0.014 -0.011 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) 
Community Involvement, 1(Always)-
4(Never) 0.03 0.035 0.03 0.035 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.023) (0.024) 
Actual Loan, When Surveyed 0 0 0 0 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Actual Loan Term, When Surveyed 0 0 0 0 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Actual Effective Annual Interest Rate, When 
Survey 0 -0.004 0 -0.004 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) 
Actual Voluntary Savings Total, When 
Surveyed -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Esperanza Health Services -0.093 -0.018 -0.093 -0.018 
 (0.106) (0.100) (0.087) (0.086) 
Loan Purpose, Quasi-Fixed Inputs 0.17 0.177 0.170* 0.177* 
 (0.100) (0.097) (0.082) (0.083) 
Monthly Sales, 0-5000 Pesos DR -0.332** -0.306* -0.332*** -0.306** 
 (0.120) (0.119) (0.098) (0.102) 
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Monthly Sales, 5000-10000 Pesos DR -0.111 -0.06 -0.111 -0.06 
 (0.129) (0.127) (0.105) (0.109) 
Monthly Sales, 10000-15000 Pesos DR -0.066 -0.063 -0.066 -0.063 
 (0.129) (0.126) (0.105) (0.108) 
Monthly Sales, 15000-20000 Pesos DR -0.013 0.021 -0.013 0.021 
 (0.139) (0.139) (0.113) (0.119) 
Monthly Sales, 20000 or more Pesos DR 0.072 0.15 0.072 0.15 
 (0.197) (0.191) (0.161) (0.163) 
Sum of Esperanza Loans Before Cornell 
Survey 0 0 0 0 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Debt Outside of Esperanza 0.065 0.041 0.065 0.041 
 (0.063) (0.062) (0.051) (0.053) 
Number of Loans Recieved, All Lenders 0.002 -0.002 0.002 -0.002 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) 
Loan History, Late Repayment, All Lenders 0.036 -0.038 0.036 -0.038 
 (0.081) (0.078) (0.066) (0.066) 
Debt Level, 1(Low)-3(High) -0.057 -0.033 -0.057 -0.033 
 (0.061) (0.058) (0.050) (0.049) 
Credit Rationing Esperanza, 1(Strongly 
Disagree)-5(Strongly Agree) 0.02 0.016 0.02 0.016 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.016) (0.017) 
Credit Necessary to Purchase Sufficient Food 0.015 -0.017 0.015 -0.017 
 (0.076) (0.068) (0.062) (0.058) 
Credit Rationing Consumption,1(Disagree)-
5(Strongly Agree)  -0.052* -0.054* -0.052* -0.054** 
 (0.025) (0.023) (0.020) (0.019) 
Credit Rationing Business,1(Disagree)-
5(Strongly Agree) -0.001 -0.022 -0.001 -0.022 
 (0.025) (0.022) (0.020) (0.019) 
Risk, 1(Risk Averse)-5(Risk Seeking) 0.035* 0.040* 0.035* 0.040** 
 (0.018) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) 
Interest Rate Aware -0.134 -0.137 -0.134* -0.137* 
 (0.078) (0.074) (0.064) (0.063) 
If Rate Increased, Borrow More 0.067 0.021 0.067 0.021 
 (0.115) (0.110) (0.094) (0.094) 
If Rate Increased, Borrow Less -0.028 -0.061 -0.028 -0.061 
 (0.070) (0.064) (0.057) (0.054) 
If Rate Decreased, Borrow More 0.246** 0.231** 0.246*** 0.231*** 
 (0.081) (0.079) (0.066) (0.067) 
If Rate Decreased, Borrow Less -0.354 -0.208 -0.354* -0.208 
 (0.195) (0.183) (0.159) (0.156) 
Survey Treatment A -0.014 -0.054 -0.014 -0.054 
 (0.064) (0.061) (0.052) (0.052) 
Surveyed at Bank Meeting -0.056 -0.138 -0.056 -0.138 
 (0.110) (0.102) (0.090) (0.087) 
Difference b/w Actual and Variant Loans 0.000* 0.000* 0.000** 0.000* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Time Between Esperanza and Cornell 
Surveys 0.007 0.003 0.007 0.003 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
Answered "No" to All Loan Options 0.629*** 0.648*** 0.629*** 0.648*** 
 (0.108) (0.097) (0.088) (0.082) 
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Individual Loan 0.065 0.005 0.065 0.005 
 (0.151) (0.151) (0.123) (0.128) 
Man -0.173 -0.384 -0.173 -0.384 
 (0.429) (0.426) (0.350) (0.364) 
Variant Loan Length 0.016 0.031 0.016 0.031 
 (0.071) (0.068) (0.058) (0.058) 
Branch, Hato Mayor -0.576 -0.208 -0.576* -0.208 
 (0.296) (0.129) (0.242) (0.110) 
Branch, San Pedro de Macoris -0.17 -0.124 -0.17 -0.124 
 (0.258) (0.116) (0.211) (0.099) 
Branch, Alcarrizos -0.246 -0.246 -0.246 -0.246 
 (0.289) (0.185) (0.236) (0.158) 
Branch, Guaricanos -0.295 -0.429 -0.295 -0.429* 
 (0.440) (0.239) (0.359) (0.204) 
Branch, Puerto Plata -0.4 -0.421** -0.4 -0.421** 
 (0.567) (0.158) (0.463) (0.135) 
Interviewer, Mirna -0.008  -0.008  
 (0.573)  (0.468)  
Interviewer, Astia -0.064  -0.064  
 (0.559)  (0.457)  
Interviewer, Lourdes -0.116  -0.116  
 (0.551)  (0.450)  
Interviewer, Emmanuel 0.655  0.655  
 (0.676)  (0.552)  
Interviewer Esmeida 0.116  0.116  
 (0.552)  (0.450)  
Interviewer, Gabriela 0.107  0.107  
 (0.557)  (0.455)  
Interviewer, Maira -0.256  -0.256  
 (0.549)  (0.448)  
Interviewer, Maximo 0.379  0.379  
 (0.556)  (0.454)  
Interviewer, Miguelina Arrendel 0.404  0.404  
 (0.616)  (0.503)  
Interviewer, Reina 0.508  0.508  
 (0.576)  (0.470)  
Interviewer, Yrene -0.203  -0.203  
 (0.450)  (0.368)  
Interviewer, Fabia 0.06  0.06  
 (0.597)  (0.487)  
Constant 1.032 1.117 1.032 1.117 
 (1.471) (1.348) (1.201) (1.149) 
sigma         
Constant   0.273*** 0.291*** 
      (0.014) (0.015) 
Observations  198 198 198 198 
Notes: Ordinary Least Squares and Tobit models reported; standard errors in parentheses. Dependent 
variable is the best elasticity estimate.  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, 
*** p<0.001     
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A.4: Robustness Check: Elasticity of Demand for Credit, OLS and Tobit 
Estimates  




  OLS Regresssions Tobit Regressions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Age 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Education, 1(Illiterate)-7(Completed College) 0.046 0.032 0.046 0.05 
 (0.053) (0.046) (0.035) (0.034) 
Vocational Training 0.06 0.128 0.06 0.171 
 (0.182) (0.172) (0.120) (0.131) 
Dependents in Elementary School -0.024 -0.017 -0.024 -0.009 
 (0.038) (0.033) (0.025) (0.024) 
Access to Water -0.044 -0.032 -0.044 -0.06 
 (0.060) (0.058) (0.040) (0.042) 




 (0.208) (0.182) (0.137) (0.135) 
Primary Income, Own Business -0.276 -0.179 -0.276 -0.2 
 (0.221) (0.205) (0.146) (0.147) 
Primary Income,Wage Labor -0.183 -0.221 -0.183 -0.273 
 (0.258) (0.229) (0.170) (0.166) 
Annual Savings, 0-5% of Income -0.108 0.061 -0.108 0.087 
 (0.187) (0.178) (0.123) (0.129) 
Annual Savings, 5-10% of Income -0.088 -0.014 -0.088 -0.016 
 (0.083) (0.082) (0.055) (0.059) 
Savings, 0-500 Pesos DR 0.128 0.125 0.128 0.215 
 (0.147) (0.143) (0.097) (0.108) 
Savings, 500-1000 Pesos DR 0.106 0.079 0.106 0.179 
 (0.145) (0.138) (0.096) (0.104) 
Religious Rating, 1(Not Religious)-8(Very 
Religious) -0.032 -0.015 -0.032 -0.014 
 (0.029) (0.025) (0.019) (0.018) 
Community Involvement, 1(Always)-4(Never) 0.028 0.043 0.028 0.02 
 (0.056) (0.054) (0.037) (0.039) 
Actual Loan, When Surveyed 0 0 0 0 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Actual Loan Term, When Surveyed 0 0 0 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Actual Effective Annual Interest Rate, When 
Surveyed -0.002 0.003 -0.002 0.008 
 (0.022) (0.020) (0.014) (0.015) 
Actual Voluntary Savings Total, When Surveyed -0.004 -0.002 -0.004 -0.003 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Esperanza Health Services 0.037 0.201 0.037 0.236 
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 (0.199) (0.184) (0.131) (0.138) 
Loan Purpose, Quasi-Fixed Inputs 0.01 0.028 0.01 0.018 
 (0.181) (0.166) (0.119) (0.121) 
Monthly Sales, 0-5000 Pesos DR -0.323 -0.317 -0.323* 
-
0.283* 
 (0.206) (0.191) (0.136) (0.139) 
Monthly Sales, 5000-10000 Pesos DR -0.064 -0.039 -0.064 0.009 
 (0.208) (0.193) (0.137) (0.144) 
Monthly Sales, 10000-15000 Pesos DR -0.03 -0.058 -0.03 0.072 
 (0.215) (0.202) (0.142) (0.157) 
Monthly Sales, 15000-20000 Pesos DR 0.017 -0.002 0.017 0.136 
 (0.229) (0.223) (0.151) (0.166) 
Monthly Sales, 20000 or more Pesos DR 0.253 0.224 0.253 0.363 
 (0.312) (0.289) (0.206) (0.211) 
Sum of Esperanza Loans Before Cornell Survey 0 0 0 0 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Debt Outside of Esperanza 0.171 0.18 0.171* 0.195* 
 (0.116) (0.115) (0.077) (0.082) 
Number of Loans Recieved, All Lenders 0 -0.009 0 -0.008 
 (0.023) (0.021) (0.015) (0.015) 
Loan History, Late Repayment, All Lenders -0.065 -0.169 -0.065 
-
0.207* 
 (0.158) (0.141) (0.104) (0.103) 
Debt Level, 1(Low)-3(High) 0.045 0.015 0.045 0.014 
 (0.118) (0.112) (0.078) (0.080) 
Credit Rationing Esperanza, 1(Strongly Disagree)-
5(Strongly Agree) 0.033 0.01 0.033 -0.005 
 (0.035) (0.032) (0.023) (0.024) 
Credit Necessary to Purchase Sufficient Food 0.033 0.02 0.033 -0.004 
 (0.141) (0.123) (0.093) (0.089) 
Credit Rationing Consumption,1(Disagree)-
5(Strongly Agree)  -0.034 -0.055 -0.034 
-
0.063* 
 (0.046) (0.036) (0.030) (0.026) 
Credit Rationing Business,1(Disagree)-5(Strongly 
Agree) 0.028 0.021 0.028 0.014 
 (0.052) (0.045) (0.034) (0.033) 
Risk, 1(Risk Averse)-5(Risk Seeking) 0.070* 0.064* 0.070** 
0.074*
** 
 (0.031) (0.029) (0.020) (0.021) 
Interest Rate Aware -0.081 -0.121 -0.081 -0.097 
 (0.147) (0.126) (0.097) (0.097) 
If Rate Increased, Borrow More -0.057 0.009 -0.057 0.208 
 (0.244) (0.213) (0.161) (0.165) 
If Rate Increased, Borrow Less -0.021 -0.068 -0.021 -0.043 
 (0.117) (0.105) (0.077) (0.076) 
If Rate Decreased, Borrow More 0.226 0.16 0.226* 0.147 
 (0.143) (0.134) (0.094) (0.099) 
If Rate Decreased, Borrow Less -0.851* -0.578 -0.851*** 
-
0.558* 
 (0.358) (0.299) (0.236) (0.218) 
Survey Treatment A -0.093 -0.116 -0.093 -0.124 
 (0.118) (0.111) (0.078) (0.085) 
Surveyed at Bank Meeting -0.191 -0.222 -0.191 -0.193 
 (0.216) (0.176) (0.142) (0.140) 
  49 
Difference b/w Actual and Variant Loans 0 0 0 0 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Time Between Esperanza and Cornell Surveys -0.016 -0.013 -0.016 -0.012 
 (0.023) (0.022) (0.015) (0.017) 
Answered "No" to All Loan Options 0.479* 0.643*** 0.479*** 
0.677*
** 
 (0.186) (0.163) (0.123) (0.118) 
Individual Loan 0.147 0.165 0.147 0.172 
 (0.314) (0.309) (0.207) (0.223) 
Man 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) 
Variant Loan Length 0.328 0.22 0.328* 0.156 
 (0.222) (0.217) (0.146) (0.155) 
Branch, Hato Mayor -0.488 -0.223 -0.488 -0.301 
 (0.654) (0.227) (0.431) (0.163) 
Branch, San Pedro de Macoris 0.168 -0.045 0.168 0 
 (0.613) (0.198) (0.404) (0.143) 
Branch, Alcarrizos -0.01 -0.14 -0.01 -0.139 
 (0.768) (0.385) (0.506) (0.275) 
Branch, Guaricanos -0.181 -0.324 -0.181 -0.414 
 (0.686) (0.360) (0.452) (0.265) 
Branch, Puerto Plata 0.027 -0.392 0.027  
 (0.804) (0.276) (0.530)  
Interviewer, Mirna 0.297  0.297  
 (0.859)  (0.566)  
Interviewer, Astia 0.265  0.265  
 (0.823)  (0.543)  
Interviewer, Lourdes -0.143  -0.143  
 (1.005)  (0.663)  
Interviewer, Emmanuel 0.909  0.909  
 (1.007)  (0.664)  
Interviewer Esmeida 0.031  0.031  
 (0.916)  (0.604)  
Interviewer, Gabriela 0.369  0.369  
 (0.984)  (0.649)  
Interviewer, Maira -0.663  -0.663  
 (0.978)  (0.645)  
Interviewer, Maximo 0.814  0.814  
 (0.864)  (0.569)  
Interviewer, Miguelina Arrendel 0.44  0.44  
 (0.969)  (0.639)  
Interviewer, Reina 0.727  0.727  
 (0.964)  (0.636)  
Interviewer, Yrene -0.09  -0.09  
 (0.573)  (0.378)  
Interviewer, Fabia 0.073  0.073  
 (0.983)  (0.648)  
Constant -1.213 -1.047 -1.213 -1.194 
 (2.549) (2.370) (1.681) (1.730) 
sigma     
Constant   0.245*** 0.276*
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** 
   (0.016) (0.019) 
Observations  115 115 115 115 
Notes: Ordinary Least Squares and Tobit models reported; standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is 
the best elasticity estimate.  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001     
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A.5: Variable Key 
 
Variable Description Source File 
Age Age of the client when Surveyed Esperanza Data Base: 
Current Clients file 
Education Education, Scale 1-5: 1, Illiterate; 2, 
Elementary; 3 Middle School; 4, 
Some/all of  High School; 5, Some/all 




Vocational Training   Vocational Training Esperanza DATA 
BASE: Client Survey 
Dependents, 
Elementary 
Number of Dependents in Elementary 
School 
Cornell Survey 
Water, Access Household Access to Water, Scale 1-3: 
1, Always; 2, Sometimes; 3, Never 
Cornell Survey 
Haitian Relatives   Whether the Client has any Haitian 
Relatives 
Cornell Survey 
Income Source, Own 
Business 
Greatest Income Source:  Own 
business (omitted variable, remittances 
or no regular income) 
Cornell Survey 
Income Source, Paid 
Work   
Greatest Income Source:  Paid Work 
(omitted variable, remittances or no 
regular income) 
Cornell Survey 
Religious Rating Self described religious sense, Scale 




Involvement in "Solving Community 
Problems" 1, always; 2, often; 3, 
sometimes; 4, never 
Cornell Survey 
Amount Disbursed Size of Loan Cornell Survey 
Length of Loan Length of Loan Cornell Survey 
Effective Interest Rate Effective Interest Rate Cornell Survey 
Voluntary Savings Voluntary Savings Cornell Survey 
Esperanza Health 
Services 
Size of Loan Cornell Survey 
Industry Primary Business: Industry Cornell Survey 
Service Primary Business: Service Cornell Survey 
Agriculture Primary Business: Agriculture Cornell Survey 
Loan, Productive  
Investment 
Loan Investment:  Productive short-
term (i.e. ingredients, machinery, or 
equipment that you will replace 
multiple times within one year) OR 
Productive long-term ( i.e. ingredients, 
machinery,  or equipment that you will 
only have to buy once in a year. Note: 
Some Clients selected multiple entries 
Cornell Survey: 
Demand Supplement 
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Monthly Sales, 0-5000 
Pesos DR   
Reported Monthly Business Sales Esperanza DATA 
BASE: Client Survey 
Monthly Sales, 5000-
10000 Pesos DR 
Reported Monthly Business Sales Esperanza DATA 
BASE: Client Survey 
Monthly Sales, 10000-
15000 Pesos DR 
Reported Monthly Business Sales Esperanza DATA 
BASE: Client Survey 
Monthly Sales, 15000-
20000 Pesos DR 
Reported Monthly Business Sales Esperanza DATA 
BASE: Client Survey 
Monthly Sales, 20000 
or more Pesos DR 
Reported Monthly Business Sales Esperanza DATA 
BASE: Client Survey 
Loans Obtained Prior 
to Survey, Sum Pesos 
DR 





Loans Received Prior 
to Survey, Number 
Number of Loans Received From 
formal financial institutions 
Cornell Survey 
Loan Paid Late Have they Ever repaid a loan late to a 
family member, friend, moneylender, 
NGO, or Bank 
Cornell Survey 
Debt Scale How would they rate their level of 
debt. , Very Low or Low; 2, 
Manageable; 3, High or very High 
Cornell Survey 
Rationing, Esperanza  Esperanza has lent them less than they 
wanted: 1, Strongly Disagree; 2, 
Disagree; 3, Neutral; 4, Agree; 5, 
Strongly Agree. 
Cornell Survey 
Credit Necessary to 
Purchase Sufficient 
Food 
If the client faced a borrowing 
constraint, they would not be able to 
acquire adequate food through the year. 
Agree or Strongly Agree. (omitted 




Consumption    
The Client is able to borrow the needed 
amount of money from development 
organizations and banks for 
consumption, education and health 
purposes. 1, Strongly Disagree; 2, 





The Client is able to borrow the needed 
amount of money from development 
organizations and banks for business 
purposes. 1, Strongly Disagree; 2, 
Disagree; 3, Neutral; 4, Agree; 5, 
Strongly Agree. 
Cornell Survey 
Willingness to Take 
Risks   
The client is willing to take risks to 
increase the chance of higher profits. 
1(Not willing to take risks) to 5 
(Willing to take risks)   
Cornell Survey 
Interest Rate Aware   The client was able reported an interest 
rate on their loan, as opposed to 
leaving it blank. 
Cornell Survey 
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Increase Rate, Borrow 
the Same   
The client would borrow the same 
amount if the interest rate on their loan 




Increase Rate, Borrow 
More    
The client would borrow less if the 
interest rat eon their loan increased 




Borrow More     
The client would borrow more if the 
interest rate on their loan decreased 






Annual Savings, 0-5% of Income 




Annual Savings, 5-10% of Income 
(omitted variable, More than 10%) 
Cornell Survey 
Accumulated Savings, 
0-500 Pesos DR 
Savings, Pesos (omitted variable 
Savings more than 1000 Pesos)   
Esperanza DATA 
BASE: Client Survey 
Accumulated Savings, 
500-1000 Pesos DR 
Savings, Pesos (omitted variable 
Savings more than 1000 Pesos)   
Esperanza DATA 
BASE: Client Survey 
Treatment A, Interest 
rate in Descending 
Order 
In the Demand Supplement, Interest 






Meeting   
Whether the Interview occurred during 
or immediately after a meeting 
Cornell Survey 
Variant – Actual Loan, 
Difference 
Difference Between Demand Variant 






Branch Branch Cornell Survey 
Interviewer Interviewer Cornell Survey 




BASE: Client Survey 
Responsed “No” to all 
answers   
Client Responded "No" to all loans 










B.1: Cornell Survey Instrument, English (Questions in bold have been 
incorporated into the analysis. Questions followed by an * were marked by 
interviewers as problematic.) 
 
Cornell University/Esperanza International 
Survey to Assess Credit Demand, Specific Credit Rationing Issues, Informal Lending 




NARRATIVE TO BE READ TO RESPONDENTS: First of all I would like to thank you for taking the 
time to meet with us. This survey should take about  and hour and again, thank you for your time. The 
survey we are conducting is a joint product between Cornell University in the United States and 
Esperanza International. We are interested in collecting information about the problems that you face 
in borrowing from bank and other financial institutions . We would like to inform you that we have 
available to us your  personal loan information provided by Esperanza by code number and not by 
your name. We would like your permission to use this information along with your responses to this 
survey for research purposes only. I can assure you that your responses will be completely 
confidential and under no circumstances will your responses be identifiable by us, Esperanza, or any 
other party. Furthermore, any link between your responses in the survey and information provided by 
Esperanza will completely anonymous. In addition, we understand that you may not have all of the 
precise information available. In these cases all we ask is that you provide us with your best estimates 
or best judgments.  Finally, you have the right to refuse to answer any question we might ask. 
 
Given these objectives are you willing to participate in this survey?  YES    NO  
If YES, PLEASE sign below 
____________________________________________________ x 
and PLEASE print your name. 
_____________________________________________________x 
 





NOTE to INTERVIEWER: If answer above is because respondent does not feel they have the 
information we need then ask why and explain again that we only require a best effort on their part, 
and that we expect that not all respondents will have precise information. And then ask if they will 
reconsider. 
 
NOTE to INTERVIEWER: If answer above is related to privacy issues, then remind respondent that 
their participation will be most helpful to our research and that they will remain anonymous and that 
their privacy is guaranteed. And then ask if they will reconsider. 
If YES then: Thank you very much. For your participation you will receive a small gift. You will 
receive this gift even if you answer NO to the following question.  
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Do we have your permission to use confidential information from Esperanza?  YES   NO.  
If YES, PLEASE sign below.  
____________________________________________________ x 
Participant Signature (If the participant is not comfortable signing their name, they may mark an "X") 
 
NOTE to INTERVIEWER: If answer above is related to privacy issues, then remind respondent that 
their participation will be most helpful to our research and that they will remain anonymous and that 
their privacy is guaranteed. And then ask if they will reconsider. 
 
Signature of Interviewer  _________________________________________ Date _______ 
Printed name of Interviewer obtaining consent ____________________ Date __________ 
 
This consent form will be kept by the researcher for at least three years beyond the end of the study 
and was approved by the IRB on [date]. 
Thank you again. Let's start. We would like to start off by asking some general questions about your 
household”……. Go to question 1. 
 
Client and Loan Characteristics 
i. The interview occurred: 
Outside of a meeting ____  During or After a Programmed Meeting _____ 
iv. INTERVIEWER ________ 
1. Full Name  ________  
2. Esperanza Branch   _____________________ 
3. City, town, or community __________________  
4. Age __ 
5. Bank of Hope ______________________ 
6. How many loans have you taken out from Esperanza, including the current loan? ____ 
7. If you have a group loan, what amount are you responsible for repaying? _______ 
8. What interest rate are you paying on your current loan? _____ Do not know _____* 
9. What is the length of your current loan? _______ 
10. Which of the following best describes your primary business? 
a) Commerce ______  
b) Industry _______ 
c) Service _______  
d) Agricultural _____ 
e) Other (please elaborate) ______ 
11.  Which of the following best describes your main source of income?  
a. Own business _______ 
b. Paid work ______ 
c. Money from family/friends ______ 
12. Since taking out your current loan, which of the following best describes the amount of 
household income that is given to you by family or friends? * 
a. None ____ 
b. At least a quarter  ____  
c. At least half _____ 
d. At least three quarters ____  
e. More than three quarters ____   
13. How many regular salaried employees do you currently have? _______ 
14. How many non-salaried employees do you have, not counting yourself (i.e. family members 
that do not expect regular compensation in PESOS)? _____ 
15. What is your marital status?  





j) Cohabitating _____ 
16. Do you have a social security number? Yes ___ NO ____ 
17. Do you have Haitian family?  
a. NO ___ 
b. Yes,  My parents, grandparents etc emigrated. _____ 
18. What was the total household income in the past year from all sources (best guess) 
*______________  
19. What was your total household income in the last month? (best guess)*  _____ 
20. What is the total amount of money that your household spent in the last month? (best guess) 
_______ 
21. Including yourself how many people live in your household?________________ 
(INTERVIEWER: this is the total number of people sharing the house of the respondent including 
children, parents etc) 
22. Among dependents: 
a. How many are too young for school? ______ 
b. How many are in elementary school?_____  
c. How many are in high school? _____  
d. How many are in college (university)? ____ 
e. How many are elderly? _____  
f. How many are ill/incapacitated? _____  
23. What is your highest education level of education?
a. Never went to school___ Some Elementary/Middle School ___  
b. Completed Elementary/Middle School_______  
c. Some High school_____  
d. Completed High School ______  
e. Some  University ____  
f. Completed University_____ 
g. Some Technical School ______ 
h. Completed Technical School _____  
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24. Does your household have electricity?  
a. Yes _____ 
b. Sometimes _____ 
c. No because I/we can not afford it  _____ 
d. No because it is not available _____ 
25. Does your household have running water?  
a. Yes _____ 
b. Sometimes _____ 
c. No because I/we can not afford it  _____ 
d. No because it is not available ____ 
26. Does your household have telephone service?  
a. Yes _____ 
b. Sometimes _____ 
c. No because I/we can not afford it  _____ 
d. No because it is not available ____ 
e. No and we do not want it _____ 
27. Do you have access to a cell phone?  
a. Yes, always _____ 
b. Yes, sometimes _____ 
c. Yes, but not often _____ 
d. No, never____ 
28. On a scale of 1 to 8 with 8 being extremely religious, how religious do you 
consider yourself?   
Not Religious at all 1  2   3  4  5  6  7  8   Extremely Religious    
29. If you subscibe to a religion, which faith are you a member of?  
a. Catholic ____ 
b. Protestant ___ 
a) Baptist ____ 
b) Methodist _____ 
c) Pentecostal _____ 
d) 7th Day Adventist ____ 
e) Other ____  
(1) Mormon ____ 
(2) Jehovah’s Witness ___  
c. Other ____ 
30. Do you involve yourself in solving your community's problems? 
a. YES, always ______ 
b. YES, often _______ 
c. YES, sometimes _______ 
d. NO, never _______ 
31. Has being a member of Esperanza has allowed you to receive at least one health 
service? YES NO If yes Please Indicate which 
a. Papsmear ____   b. Dental Services _____   c.  Group Health 
Discussions_______ d. Other _____ 
 
 
INTERVIEWER: Thank you so much for all of that information, now we will move on to the next 
section. With these questions we want to learn what size loans and what interest rates you prefer.  
 
Credit Demand:   




Thank you so much for that information. Now we would like to question you on your finances, and 
more specifically on your experiences borrowing and lending.   
 
Finance and Risk Management 
32. Aside from your loan with Esperanza, do you have any debt outstanding? YES __NO __* 
a. IF YES please indicate the total amount of money you owe including money 
owed to  
b. Friends  __________ 
c. Relatives __________ 
d. Money lenders __________ 
e. Development organizations __________ 
f. Commercial banks ______ 
g. Other (Please list source and amount) _________________ 
_____________________ 
h. Whether or not you have debt outstanding, please indicate the approximate interest rates 
of these loans. INTERVIEWER “This is very helpful. Now I would like to ask you about interest 
rates charged on the most recent loan that you have had by source. For each of lender types I will 
list I would like you to provide the ‘ACTUAL’ interest rate charged. If you have not borrowed 
from the lender type I would like you to indicate the interest rate that you ‘BELIEVE’ would be 
charged by the lender. What you believe could be based on rates that you have heard from friends 
or relatives, or any other source that you believe reliable.” (INTERVIEWER: In each case read 
‘ACTUAL’, ‘BELIEVE’, ‘DON’T KNOW’ 
a) Friends  ACTUAL _____BELIEVE______ DON’T KNOW ______ 
b) Relatives ACTUAL _____BELIEVE______ DON’T KNOW ______ 
c) Money lenders ACTUAL _____BELIEVE______ DON’T KNOW 
__ 
d) Development organizations ACTUAL _____BELIEVE______
 DON’T KNOW ______ 
e) Commercial banks ACTUAL _____BELIEVE______ DON’T 
KNOW ______ 
f) Other  ACTUAL _____BELIEVE______ DON’T KNOW ______ 
33. If you sell all your assets (business, home, land, livestock etc.) how much will you get (in 
PESOS) _____________________. INTERVIEWER: This may be a difficult question to answer 
because it places a value on the asset values. If respondent does not know or does not 
understand, simply enter Don’t Know. 
34. Regarding your current total amount of debts, assets and productivity, what do you think 
about your debt level? (Use a 1 to 5 scale with 1 = very low, 2 = low, 3 = manageable, 4 = high, 
and 5 = very high (Circle the most appropriate response). 
a. 1 = very low 
b. 2 = low 
c.  3 = manageable 
d. 4 = high 
e. 5 = very high 
35. How many loans have you requested from  formal financial institutions in the past?______ 
36. How many loans have you received from formal financial institutions in the 
past? ______ 
37. Among  loans that you have requested from formal institutions  in the past , how 
many were the full amount that you requested? 
38. Have you ever been denied a loan by a formal financial institution (development 
organization or commercial bank) in the past excluding Esperanza?  YES_______
 NO_______ 
a. If YES what are the major reasons you were denied credit? (answer more than 
one if necessary) 
b. Insufficient collateral ___________ 
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c. Main source of income subject to too much price risk  _________ 
d. I have failed to repay the loan in the past __________ 
e. Bank does not believe I am trustworthy ___________ 
f. The development organization or commercial bank does not /did not  believe that 
I earn/ed enough income  ________ 
g. The repayment schedule required by the formal financial institution  
(development organization or commercial bank) does not match the timing of 
sales from my small business 
39. Have you ever been late in repaying a loan? (INTERVIEWER: By ‘being 
late’ we mean that payment was not promptly paid as agreed upon by the lender, but 
payment was eventually made.) 
a. Relative YES _____ No____ 
b. Friend  YES _____ No____ 
c. Money Lender YES _____ No____ 
d. Esperanza          YES _____       No _____ 
e. Development organization/bank other than Esperanza YES _____No____ 
f. Commercial Bank YES _____ No____ 
g. Other      YES _____ No____ 
40. Have you ever defaulted on a loan (that is not repaid)? (INTERVIEWER: By 
defaulting we mean that loan was NEVER repaid as agreed upon by the lender) 
a. Relative YES _____ No____ 
b. Friend  YES _____ No____ 
c. Money Lender YES _____ No____ 
d. Esperanza   YES _____ No ______ 
e. Development organization/bank  YES _____ No____ 
f. Commercial Bank YES _____ No____ 
g. Other  YES _____ No____ 
 
INTERVIEWER: Now I would like to ask you some questions about the borrowing environment. 
For these questions please respond with one of the  following Strongly Agree, Moderately Agree, 
Agree, Disagree, Moderately Disagree, Strongly Disagree. (Interviewer after reading each 
question repeat the list starting with Strongly agree) 
 
41. Esperanza is more flexible in repayment terms than other development 
organizations or commercial banks.  
a. Strongly Agree____  
b. Agree_____  
c. Neutral_____  
d. Disagree _____ 
e. Strongly Disagree ____  
42. Money lenders are more flexible in repayment terms than other development 
organizations or commericial banks . 
a. Strongly Agree____  
b. Agree_____  
c. Neutral_____  
d. Disagree _____ 
e. Strongly Disagree ____  
43. Relatives are more flexible in repayment terms than other development 
organizations or commercial banks. * 
a. Strongly Agree____  
b. Agree_____  
c. Neutral_____  
d. Disagree _____ 
e. Strongly Disagree ____  
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44. Friends are more flexible in repayment terms than other development 
organizations or commercial banks. 
a. Strongly Agree____  
b. Agree_____  
c. Neutral_____  
d. Disagree _____ 
e. Strongly Disagree ____  
45. Borrowing from relatives or friends causes them hardship. 
a. Strongly Agree____  
b. Agree_____  
c. Neutral_____  
d. Disagree _____ 
e. Strongly Disagree ____  
46. I would be willing to pay more than a development organization or commercial 
bank interest rate in order to obtain a loan. 
a. Strongly Agree____  
b. Agree_____  
c. Neutral_____  
d. Disagree _____ 
e. Strongly Disagree ____  
47. Who did you last borrow money from? (before your current loan) 
a. Relative _____ 
b. Friend _____ 
c. Moneylender _____ 
d. Esperanza _____ 
e. Development Organization (Not including Esperanza)  _____ 
f. Commercial Bank _____ 
g. Other _____ 
48. Recalling the last time you borrowed money (before your current loan) what was 
it for? (INTERVIEWER read the following list) 
a. Business development ____________ 
b. Health/medicine _______________ 
c. Wedding ____________________ 
d. Funeral _______________ 
e. School tuition  ________________ 
f. Production agriculture (fertilizer, seed, hired labour etc) ______________ 
g. Machinery and equipment ____________ 
h. House construction. _________________ 
i. Household consumption __________________ 
j. Holiday/vacation ______________________ 
k. Other (INTERVIEWER to write down 
item)_______________________________ 
 
INTERVIEWER: Thank you for your patience. I have just a few more questions on TRUST that I 
would like to ask you. For these questions please respond to one of the following Strongly Agree, 
Moderately Agree, Agree, Disagree, Strongly Disagree. (Interviewer after reading each question 
repeat the list starting with strongly agree) 
 
49. You trust that the members of your group will repay on time.  
a. Strongly Agree____  
b. Agree_____  
c. Neutral_____  
d. Disagree _____ 
e. Strongly Disagree ____  
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50. If you make a loan to a family member or relative, you TRUST the family 
member/relative to pay it back within a reasonable period of time 
a. Strongly Agree____  
b. Agree_____  
c. Neutral_____  
d. Disagree _____ 
e. Strongly Disagree ____  
51. If you make a loan to a friend, you TRUST the friend to pay it back within a 
reasonable period of time. 
a. Strongly Agree____  
b. Agree_____  
c. Neutral_____  
d. Disagree _____ 
e. Strongly Disagree ____  
52. If a family member or relative makes a loan to you the family member does so 
because the family member/relative TRUSTS that you will pay it back in a reasonable period of 
time. 
a. Strongly Agree____  
b. Agree_____  
c. Neutral_____  
d. Disagree _____ 
e. Strongly Disagree ____  
53. If a friend makes a loan to you the friend does so because the friend TRUSTS 
that you will pay it back in a reasonable period of time. 
a. Strongly Agree____  
b. Agree_____  
c. Neutral_____  
d. Disagree _____ 
e. Strongly Disagree ____  
54. In your community informal lending between friends and relatives occurs because you 
TRUST one another. 
a. Strongly Agree____  
b. Agree_____  
c. Neutral_____  
d. Disagree _____ 
e. Strongly Disagree ____  
55. If you had money available you would lend to a friend or a relative even 
though you MAY NOT TRUST them to repay the loan. 
a. Strongly Agree____  
b. Agree_____  
c. Neutral_____  
d. Disagree _____ 
e. Strongly Disagree ____  
56. If you needed a loan from Esperanza but do not have the collateral to 
support the loan, Esperanza will lend to you anyway because Esperanza TRUSTS you to pay it 
back. 
a. Strongly Agree____  
b. Agree_____  
c. Neutral_____  
d. Disagree _____ 
e. Strongly Disagree ____  
57. If you needed a loan from a development organization/bank  other than 
Esperanza  but do not have the collateral to support the loan, the bank will lend to you anyway 
because the development organization/bank TRUSTS you to pay it back.* 
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a. Strongly Agree____  
b. Agree_____  
c. Neutral_____  
d. Disagree _____ 
e. Strongly Disagree ____  
58. If you needed a loan from a bank but do not have the collateral to 
support the loan, the bank will lend to you anyway because the bank TRUSTS you to pay it back.* 
a. Strongly Agree____  
b. Agree_____  
c. Neutral_____  
d. Disagree _____ 
e. Strongly Disagree ____  
59. If you needed a loan from a Money Lender but do not have the 
collateral to support the loan, the Money Lender will lend to you anyway because the Money 
Lender TRUSTS you to pay it back.* 
a. Strongly Agree____  
b. Agree_____  
c. Neutral_____  
d. Disagree _____ 
e. Strongly Disagree ____  
60. This is a hypothetical situation. Suppose that you owed 1,000 PESOS to each Esperanza, 
another development organization/bank, a commercial bank, a Money lender, friend, relative for a 
total indebtedness of 5,000 PESOS. Now suppose that you had available $1,000 PESOS to repay 
the loans. Which of the following is most likely to occur (select only 1)?* 
a. You would pay back a family member or relative before anyone else 
b. You would pay back a friend before anyone else 
c. You would pay back Esperanza before anyone else 
d. You would pay back the development organization/bank (not incl. Esperanza) 
before anyone else  
e. You would pay back the commercial bank before anyone else 
f. You would pay back the money lender before anyone else. 
g. You would pay some money to all of the lenders 
 
Credit Rationing Model 
INTERVIEWER Thank you so much. With these next questions we want to get a sense of how 
difficult/easy it is for you to get the loans you want.  For these questions please respond to the 
statements with one of the  following:  Strongly Agree, Moderately Agree, Agree, Disagree, 
Moderately Disagree, Strongly Disagree 
61. Esperanza has given me a loan that I could not have received elsewhere.  
a. Strongly Agree____  
b. Agree_____  
c. Neutral_____  
d. Disagree _____ 
e. Strongly Disagree ____  
62. Esperanza has lent me less than I initially wanted.  
a. Strongly Agree____  
b. Agree_____  
c. Neutral_____  
d. Disagree _____ 
e. Strongly Disagree ____  
63. If I had more assets, then I could get a higher loan from a bank or development 
organization without using the assets for collateral.* 
a. Strongly Agree____  
  
 63 
b. Agree_____  
c. Neutral_____  
d. Disagree _____ 
e. Strongly Disagree ____  
64. If I had more assets, then I could get a higher loan from a bank or development 
organization but only if I use the assets as collateral. * 
a. Strongly Agree____  
b. Agree_____  
c. Neutral_____  
d. Disagree _____ 
e. Strongly Disagree ____  
65.  If I had more assets, then I could get a higher loan from a bank or development 
organization, at a lower interest rate, without using the assets as collateral.* 
a. Strongly Agree____  
b. Agree_____  
c. Neutral_____  
d. Disagree _____ 
e. Strongly Disagree ____  
66. If I had more assets, then I could get a higher loan from a bank or development 
organization, at a lower interest rate, but only if I use the assets as collateral.* 
a. Strongly Agree____  
b. Agree_____  
c. Neutral_____  
d. Disagree _____ 
e. Strongly Disagree ____  
 
Credit Rationing Impact 
Please answer the following questions. Interviewer here we use the term ‘borrowing constraint’. 
By borrowing constraint we mean that the owner of the microenterprise cannot obtain all of the 
funds requested from a development organization or bank in the amounts or time frame required. 
For these questions please respond to the statements with one of the  following:  Strongly Agree, 
Moderately Agree, Agree, Disagree, Moderately Disagree, Strongly Disagree 
 
67. If I faced a borrowing constraint I would use less input than is required for maximizing 
microenterprise income.* 
a. Strongly Agree____  
b. Agree_____  
c. Neutral_____  
d. Disagree _____ 
e. Strongly Disagree ____  
68. If I faced a borrowing constraint I would need wages from  additional employment.  
a. Strongly Agree____  
b. Agree_____  
c. Neutral_____  
d. Disagree _____ 
e. Strongly Disagree ____  
69. If I faced a borrowing constraint I would not be able to provide a strong education and 
adequate health care for my children.* 
a. Strongly Agree____  
b. Agree_____  
c. Neutral_____ 
d. Disagree _____ 
e. Strongly Disagree ____  
  
 64 
70. If I faced a borrowing constraint my family members (including me) would not be 
able to get adequate food throughout the year.* 
a. Strongly Agree____  
b. Agree_____  
c. Neutral_____  
d. Disagree _____ 
e. Strongly Disagree ____  
71. If I could get adequate credit from a bank or development organization I would  
a. Move to a larger town or city and start a different more lucrative business there 
____ 
b. Remain where I am and expand my microenterprise ______ 
 
Guilt questions 
Thank you so much, now we are on to our next section. In this section we will ask you to respond 
on a scale from 1 to 8.  
72. Have you ever defaulted on a loan from a family member? __ YES ___     No 
a. If YES, how guilty did you feel?  Not guilty 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Very guilty 
b. If no, how much guilt would you have felt if you had defaulted? Not guilty 1 2 3 
4 5 6 7 8 Very guilt 
73. Have you ever defaulted on a loan from a neighbor?  ___ YES ____   No* 
a. If YES, how guilty did you feel?  Not guilty 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Very guilty 
b. If no, how much guilt would you have felt if you had defaulted? Not guilty 1 2 3 
4 5 6 7 8 Very guilty  
 
74. Have you ever defaulted on a loan from Esperanza?     ___   YES   ____           No 
a. If YES, how guilty did you feel?  Not guilty 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Very guilty 
b. If no, how much guilt would you have felt if you had defaulted? Not guilty 1 2 3 
4 5 6 7 8 Very guilt 
75. Have you ever defaulted on a loan from another financial institution? __YES __ No* 
a. If YES, how guilty did you feel?  Not guilty 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Very guilty 
b. If no, how much guilt would you have felt if you had defaulted? Not guilty 1 2 3 
4 5 6 7 8 Very guilt 
76. Have you ever defaulted on a loan from a moneylender? __ YES ____            No 
a. If YES, how guilty did you feel?  Not guilty 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Very guilty 
b. If no, how much guilt would you have felt if you had defaulted? Not guilty 1 2 3 
4 5 6 7 8 Very guilt 
 
INTERVIEWER: Thank you. For these next questions please respond with one of the  following 
Strongly Agree, Moderately Agree, Agree, Disagree, Moderately Disagree, Strongly Disagree. 
(Interviewer after reading each question repeat the list starting with Strongly agree) 
77. The time of year makes a difference in whether or not I can repay a loan on time or at all.  
a. Strongly Agree____  
b. Agree_____  
c. Neutral_____  
d. Disagree _____ 
e. Strongly Disagree ____  
78. If you in any way agree, this is due to which of the following (select all that apply)  
a. Weather ____ 
b. Changes in the numbers of Toursits  ____ 
c. Agricultural harvests _____ 
d. Change in political administrations _____ 
e. Costs associated with my dependents (i.e. schooling) _____ 
f. Holidays and other community events _______ 
g. Other ____ 
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79. My ability to repay is affected by the loan officer that is responsible for collecting my 
loan. 
a. Strongly Agree____  
b. Agree_____  
c. Neutral_____  
d. Disagree _____ 
e. Strongly Disagree ____  
80. How many times has your loan officer arrived late to a meeting?  
a. Never _____ 
b. Few Times ____ 
c. Often ____ 
d. Always ____ 
81. On a scale from 1 to  5,  Do you consider your loan officer to be an honest person? 
    (YES) 1   2  3   4    5   (NO) 
82. On a scale from 1 to 5, Does your loan officer keep up on the development of your 
business?(YES) 1   2  3   4    5   (NO) 
83. Has your loan officer visited you at least once in between programmed meetings? 
YES__NO__* 
84. In your history with Esperanza, how many loan officers have you had? _____ 
85. What proportion of Household income are you able to save in a year (in PESOS): 
a. None      
b. Less than 5%          
c. Between 5 and 10%   
d. More than 10% 
86. Which of the following best describes where you save your money?  
a. In a commercial bank account created by Esperanza ______ 
b. In a commercial bank account that was not created  by Esperanza ____ 
c. In a development bank ______ 
d. In a cooperative ______ 
e. At home ______ 
f. With family and/or friends ______ 
g. I do not have any savings ______ 
87. If there is a significant reduction in uncertainty in your income would you be 
more likely to (select only 1) 
a. Decrease savings and increase investment in your business ______ 
b. Decrease savings and increase purchases of household consumer goods______ 
c. Decrease savings and increase travel/vacation_____ 
d. Maintain the same amount of savings_______ 
e. Increase savings slightly_______ 
f. Increase savings significantly_____ 
 
INTERVIEWER: For these questions please respond to the statements with one of the  following:  
Strongly Agree, Moderately Agree, Agree, Disagree, Moderately Disagree, Strongly Disagree 
88. I am able to borrow needed amount of money from development organizations and 
banks for consumption, education and health purposes. * 
a. Strongly Agree____  
b. Agree_____  
c. Neutral_____  
d. Disagree _____ 
e. Strongly Disagree ____  
89. I am able to borrow needed amount of money from development organizations or 
banks for business purposes. 
a. Strongly Agree____  
b. Agree_____  
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c. Neutral_____  
d. Disagree _____ 
e. Strongly Disagree ____  
90. When I am not able to borrow a needed amount of money from development 
organizations and banks for consumption, education and health purposes, I find it convenient to 
borrow from 
a. Moneylenders____ 
b. Friends ________ 
c. Relatives ________ 
91. When I am not able to borrow a needed amount of money from development 
organizations and banks for business purposes, I find it convenient to borrow from  
a. Moneylenders____ 
b. Friends ________ 
c. Relatives ________ 
INTERVIEWER: For these questions please respond with one of the  following Strongly Agree, 
Moderately Agree, Agree, Disagree, Moderately Disagree, Strongly Disagree. (INTERVIEWER 
after reading each question repeat the list starting with Strongly agree) 
 
92. Whether or not you have ever defaulted on a loan from a development organization, bank, 
friend or a relative, a lack of resources would most likely be the cause of a default in the past or 
future.  
a. Strongly Agree____  
b. Agree_____  
c. Neutral_____  
d. Disagree _____ 
e. Strongly Disagree ____  
93. Whether or not you have ever defaulted on a loan from a development organization, bank, 
friend or a relative, the terms of contract not being clear would most likely be the cause of a 
default in the past or future.  
a. Strongly Agree____  
b. Agree_____  
c. Neutral_____  
d. Disagree _____ 
e. Strongly Disagree ____  
94. Whether or not you have ever defaulted on a loan from a development organization, bank, 
friend or a relative, suffering a business loss/drawback  would most likely be the cause of a 
default in the past or future.  
a. Strongly Agree____  
b. Agree_____  
c. Neutral_____  
d. Disagree _____ 
e. Strongly Disagree ____  
95. Whether or not you have ever defaulted on a loan from a development organization, bank, 
friend or a relative, suffering a death or major sickness of a family member would most likely 
be the cause of a default in the past or future.  
a. Strongly Agree____  
b. Agree_____  
c. Neutral_____  
d. Disagree _____ 
e. Strongly Disagree ____  
96. Whether or not you have ever defaulted on a loan from a development organization, bank, 
friend or a relative, diverting the loan for another purpose would most likely be the cause of a 
default in the past or future.  
a. Strongly Agree____  
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b. Agree_____  
c. Neutral_____  
d. Disagree _____ 
e. Strongly Disagree ____  
97 a.Whether or not you have ever defaulted on a loan from a development organization, bank, 
friend or a relative, other reasons not listed above would be the cause of a default in the past or 
future.  
a. Strongly Agree____  
b. Agree_____  
c. Neutral_____  
d. Disagree _____ 
e. Strongly Disagree ____  
 
Group Dynamics 
97. How many groups have you had? *________  
a. If you have been a member of more than one group, What was the reason for 
switching groups? 
ii) Group grew in size and had to be split _____ 
iii) I moved homes____ 
iv) I experienced problems group member/s _____ 
v) In general for any group loan, how well did you know the group members?  
vi) Very Well ___   
vii) Well ____  
viii) Not Well ___  
ix) Not at all ____ 
98. How well do you know the members of your current group?  
a. Very Well ___   
b. Well ____  
c. Not Well ___  
d. Not at all ____ 
e. No Preference ___  
 
Thank you so much, For these questions please respond to the statements with one of the 
following:  Strongly Agree, Moderately Agree, Agree, Disagree, Moderately Disagree, Strongly 
Disagree  
 
99. One a scale of 1 to 5, Would you prefer that members of your group be family members?  
 (YES)   1  2  3   4   5  (NO) 
100. On a scale of 1 to 5, Have you been satisfied with your group experience(s) overall? 
   (YES)   1  2  3   4   5  (NO) 
101. Consider the last group that you joined, please describe how your group was formed. 
a. Chose all group members ___  
b. Chose some group members ____ 
c. Someone asked me to join ____ 
d. Was assigned a group by my loan officer ___  
e. Other ______ 
102. Have any of your group members ever failed to fully pay any quota on time? YES __ NO 
_____ 
a. If YES, did a member of your Bank of Esperanza not including members of your 
immediate group pay the quota? YES ____ NO _____ 
103. Have you ever failed to fully pay a quota on time? YES ____ NO _____ 
a. If YES, did a member of your Bank of Esperanza not including members  of your 
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group pay the quota? YES ____ NO _____ 
104. If you have taken out a group loan, has your group ever failed to fully pay a quota to 
Esperanza  on time? YES ____ NO _____ 
a. If your group has ever failed to fully pay a quota on time, what is the maximum 
number of days late that you were in repaying ? ____Days   ____ Did NOT 
Repay 
105. On a scale from 1 to 5, Which type of loan do you prefer?      Individual  1   2   3   4   5   
Group  
106. Do you plan to take out future loans from Esperanza? YES ___ NO ___  UNSURE ___ 
107. IF YES, how many loans do you plan to take out from Esperanza? At least 1 ____ Less 
than 5_____  More than 5 _____  
108. IF NO, will you borrow money from other sources? YES ___ NO ____  
109. If you think of borrowing from others,  who do you think of borrowing from?  
a. Friends _____  
b. Relatives ____  
c. Money lender ___  
d. Development organization (Not including Esperanza)___  
e. Banks ___  
f. Others ______  
110. Do you expect to fully repay all of the money owed to Esperanza?  
a. Fully repay on time ______ 
b. Repay fully but late ______  
c. No ______  
 
Sources of Risk and Risk Perceptions 
INTERVIEWER: Thank you so much. We are now VERY close to finishing. For this next set of 
questions we ask that you take a moment to consider each statement and then answer on a scale of 
1-5.  
 









112. Please indicate how important you believe each item to be in terms of risk management 
in your business. Then, mark an “X” if you do not use this to manage risk in your operation. 
Scale with 1 = not important, 2 = less important, 3 = neutral, 4 = important, and 5 = very important 















a. ...to increase the chance of higher 
profits  
1 2 3 4 5 
b. ...with new ventures or technologies 
before I see good results among others 
1 2 3 4 5 
c. ... with new management practices before 
I see good results among others  
1 2 3 4 5 
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INTERVIEWER: Thank you so much for all of that. We have finally gotten to our last question. 







113. "Imagine that an honest stranger approaches you with a gamble that depends on the toss 
of a coin. If the coin lands heads you get the amount in the first column and if it lands tails you get 
the amount in the second column. If the gamble was repeated by many flips of the coin you would 
expect to receive the amount in the third column. Study the six gambles in the table and select the 
one gamble that you would prefer".* 
 
Choice Gain  




If coin falls 
Tails 
(PESOS) 
Gain after playing 
several times  
(PESOS) 
1 $500 $500 $500 
2 $950 $450 $700 
3 $1200 $400 $800 
4 $1500 $300 $900 
5 $1900 $100 $1000 
6 $2000 0 $1000 
 
 
INTERVIEWER “Thank you this has been extremely helpful. We are incredibly thankful for your 
patience and honesty . Again, your answers  will go towards understanding the types of loans you 
prefer, and the sorts of borrowing limitations that you experience. Overall we hope to improve the 
lending environment for you. Thank you again." 




   Very 
Important 
a. Enterprise diversification, more 
than one business venture  
 1 2 3 4 5 
b. Clients in different locations 
(geographic diversification) 
 1 2 3 4 5 
c. Spreading sales: selling each 
product over a period of time rather 
than all at once (diversified 
marketing) 
 1 2 3 4 5 
d. Using contracts to market your 
product in advance at a fixed price 
 1 2 3 4 5 
f. Maintaining financial reserves: 
having cash and readily convertible 
assets  
 1 2 3 4 5 
g. Investing in other sources of 
income 




B.2: Demand Supplement, English Version with Loan Template  
 
Credit Demand Estimation 
Supplemental Section 
TEMPLATE 
Client ID: _____________________ 
Branch: _________________________ 
Gender:    M ____   F _____ 
 
INTERVIEWER: First, we would like to ask you about the type of loans that you prefer.   
2) Considering your current loan, which of the following would you want to do if 
interest rates INCREASED:  
a) Borrow MORE 
b) Borrow LESS 
c) Borrow the  SAME AMOUNT 
d) Don’t Know ____ 
 
3) Considering your current loan, which of the following would you want to do if 
interest rates DECREASED:  
a) Borrow MORE 
b) Borrow LESS 
c) Borrow the  SAME AMOUNT 
d) Don’t Know ____ 
 
4) Which of the following best describe what you have used and are using your loan 
for? Please select all that apply and rank with a number (1 indicating that you have spent 
more of your loan for  this purpose, followed by 2,3 etc).  
a) Products for the Business ____ 
b) Employee salaries _____ 
c) Productive short-term (i.e. ingredients, machinery, or equipment that you will 
replace multiple times within one year)  _____ 
d) Productive long-term  (i.e. ingredients, machinery,  or equipment that you 
will only have to buy once in a year) ___ 
 
5) On a scale from 1 to 5, do you prefer to repay a loan in EQUAL quotas?  
          (Do not prefer)      1   2    3    4     5       (Prefer)  
 
6) On a scale from 1 to 5, would you prefer to repay MORE of your loan in the 
BEGINNING of your loan period (i.e. larger quotas at the end)?  
 (Do not prefer)      1   2    3    4     5       (Prefer) 
 
7) On a scale from 1 to 5, would you prefer to repay MORE of your loan in the END of your 
loan period (i.e. larger quotas at the end)?   




INTERVIEWER: Now we would like to ask you more specific questions that are based on your 
current loan. For all of these questions we ask that you assume that you have taken a __ MONTH 
LOAN  of ___  PESOS  from Esperanza.  
 
7-14) Assume for this question that you have a __ MONTH loan  of ___ PESOS, and you  
make exactly the same investments as you indicated earlier. Now suppose that the rate were 
to increase/decrease from 4% to__ % per month or __% Annual. This means that you would 
pay roughly ___  MORE/LESS PESOS on your current loan per month with a total payment 
of __ PESOS per month. At this new interest rate which of the following loan amounts would 
you be willing to borrow if you could borrow as much as you want? (Please answer YES or 











A      
B      
C      
D      
E      
F      
G      
H      
I      
J      
K      





B.3: Cornell Survey Instrument and Demand Supplement, Spanish Version 
 
Esperanza International / Universidad de Cornell (Estados Unidos) 
ENCUESTA para  Evaluar la Demanda de Crédito, las Limitaciones de Crédito, 
Préstamos Informales entre Amigos y Parientes, y Pago 
NARRATIVA  para leerles a los participantes:  
En primer lugar, quisiera agradecerles por tomar el tiempo para encontrarse con nosotros. 
Esta encuesta debe durar aproximadamente una hora y otra vez, gracias por su participación. 
Esta encuesta es una colaboración entre la Universidad de Cornell en los Estados Unidos y 
Esperanza Internacional. Nos interesa recopilar información sobre las limitaciones que Ud. 
encuentra para conseguir préstamos de bancos y otras instituciones financieras. Quisiéramos 
informarle que tenemos dispuesto que la información sobre sus préstamos sea documentada 
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según código y no según su nombre. Quisiéramos tener su permiso para utilizar esta 
información además de sus respuestas a esta encuesta, solamente con el propósito de investigar. 
Puedo asegurarle que sus respuestas quedarán completamente confidencial y bajo ningún 
concepto será posible identificarlas con su nombre.  Además de esto, cualquier enlace que 
exista entre sus respuestas a la encuesta y la información provista  por Esperanza será 
completamente anónima. También, entendemos que es posible que Ud. no tendrá dispuesta 
respuestas exactas a estas preguntas. En estos casos, le pedimos provenirnos con sus mejores 
estimados. En fin, tiene Ud. el derecho de rehusar responder a cualquier pregunta.  
Con estos objetivos, ¿Está dispuesta a participar en esta encuesta y nos da su permiso usar 
información confidencial de Esperanza?  SÍ ____ NO ___ 
Si SÍ, POR FAVOR firma 
____________________________________________________ x 
(Por favor, ENTREVISTADOR entre su nombre muy clara si no pueda) 
Y POR FAVOR escriba su nombre 
_____________________________________________________x 
Firma del Participante (Si no se  puede escribir el nombre, se puede escribir un "X") 
NOTA a ENTREVISTADOR/A: Si la respuesta arriba indica que el participante no se siente que 
tenga la información que necesitamos entonces explícale otra vez que solo necesitamos su mejor 
esfuerzo, y que entendemos que no todos de los participantes tendrán información exacta. 
Después, pregúntele si reconsiderará.   
NOTA a ENTREVISTADOR/A: Si la respuesta arriba tiene que ver con cuestiones de 
privacidad, entonces recuérdele que su participación será muy útil en nuestra investigación y 
que permanecerá confidencial y que su privacidad es garantizada. Después, pregúntele si 
reconsideraría. 
Si SÍ, POR FAVOR ¿Tenemos también su permiso usar  información confidencial de 
Esperanza? SÍ ____   NO____ 
Si SÍ, Por favor firme una vez más, gracias. 
____________________________________________________ x 
Firma del Participante (Si no se  puede escribir el nombre, se puede escribir un "X") 
NOTA a ENTREVISTADOR/A: Sí la respuesta arriba tiene que ver con cuestiones de 
privacidad, entonces recordarle que su participación será muy útil en nuestra investigación y 
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que permanecerá confidencial y que su privacidad es garantizada. Después, pregúntele si 
reconsiderará.  
Firma del/a ENTREVISTADOR/A consiguiendo permiso   
_________________________________________ Fecha _______ 
Nombre escrito del/a ENTREVISTADOR/A consiguiendo permiso  
_________________________________________________ Fecha __________ 
Esta hoja de autorización será retenida por el investigador por lo menos tres anos después del 
fin del estudio y ha sido aprobado por el IRB de la Universidad de Cornell.   
 
“Muchísimas gracias por su permiso. Vamos a empezar. Quisiéramos empezar preguntándole 
algunos preguntas generales sobre Ud.”….   
Por favor, continúe a la pregunta 1.. 
ENTREVISTADOR/A: ___________________________________________ 
FECHA: ___________________________________ 
I. Características de la ASOCIADA y del PRÉSTAMO 
INFORMACIÓN BÁSICA 
1.  ¿Esta entrevistandole a la asociada durante/inmediatamente despues de 
una reunión programada? SI __ NO (La buscaba en su comunidad/casa) _____ 
2. Nombre 
Completo______________________________________________ 
3. Banco de Esperanza  _________________________________ 
4.  Número total de miembros de su grupo (Incluyéndole a la asociada) 
______________ 
5. Sucursal    ________ 
6. Pueblo o Comunidad _____________________________________ 
7. ¿Cuántos minutos dura el viaje desde su casa hasta la oficina central de su 
Sucursal (San Pedro, Puerto Plata, Samana, Hato Mayor)?       __________ 
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MINUTOS  (Promedio) 
8.  Edad    ______      AÑOS 
9. ¿Cuántos préstamos ha conseguido de Esperanza, incluyendo lo actual? 
______ 
10. ¿De cuanto es su préstamo? ________________ 
11. ¿Qué tasa de interés paga Ud.?       _____%      No Sabe  _______ 
12. ¿Cuánto dura su préstamo actual?_______ 
 
 
13. ¿En qué tipo de negocio ha invertido su préstamo?  
a. Comercio (ej. Venta de ropa, Venta de fritura, Colmado,  Panadería etc.) ______  
b. Industria (i.e.  Elaboración de  casaba, Elaboración de dulces etc.) _______ 
c. Servicio ( i.e. Salón de Belleza, Taxista) _______  
d. Agricultura   _____ 
14. ¿Cuáles de las siguientes opciones describe mejor su fuente mayor de ingresos ahora?  
a. Propio negocio___     b. Trabajo asalariado ___    c. Le manda su familia (remesas) ____ 
d. No tiene ingresos regulares____ 
 
15. ¿Después de sacar su préstamo actual, que porcentaje de sus ingresos recibe Ud. de sus 
parientes o amigos (remesas)?  
 a.Nada ______ b. Menos de la cuarta parte _____ c. La mitad____ d. Casi 
todo _____ 
 
16. ¿Es Ud. la sola dueña de su negocio? (No comparte con otro/a)  SI _____   NO ______  
 
17. ¿Cuántos empleados pagados tiene Ud. en su empleo ahora? ___ 
 
18. ¿Cuántos empleados no pagados tiene Ud. en su negocio (hijos etc., no incluyéndole a Ud.)? 
___ 
 
19. ¿Cuál es su estado civil?  
a. Casada ___  b.  Soltera_____ c.  Viuda_____ d. Divorciada_____  e. Unión Libre ______ 
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20. ¿Tiene Ud. cedula o pasaporte?  SÍ _________NO ______ 
 
21. ¿Tiene Ud. parientes de Haití?   
a. NO ______                  
b. SÍ, emigraron mis padres, abuelos, o antepasados  ______ 
 
22. ¿Cuál es el monto de los ingresos de su casa en el año pasado (mejor estimación)? _____ 
 
23. ¿Cuál fue el monto total de los ingresos de su casa el mes pasado (mejor estimación)? 
_________ 
 
24. ¿Cuál fue la cantidad total del gasto en su casa en el mes pasado (mejor estimación)? 
________ 
 
25. ¿Incluyendo Ud., cuántas personas viven en su casa?  ________________ 
(ENTREVISTADOR/A: esto es el número total de personas que compartan la casa del/a 
participante, incluyendo niños, padres etc.)  
 
26. De las personas que dependen de Ud. en su casa:  
a. ¿Cuántos son demasiado pequeños para asistir a la escuela? ______ 
b. ¿Cuántos están en escuela primaria?_____  
c. ¿Cuántos están en escuela secundaria? _____ 
d. ¿Cuántos están en bachillerato? _____  
e. ¿Cuántos están en la universidad? ____ 
f. ¿Cuántos tienen más de 50 años? _____  
g. ¿Cuántos están enfermo/as o incapacitado/as? _____  
 
27. ¿Cuál es el más alto grado de educación alcanzado por Ud.? (Por favor entre el numero 
del grado)  
a. NO  tiene  educación formal___ 
b. Parte de la escuela primaria___ 
c. Escuela primaria_______ 
d. Parte del bachillerato_____ 
e. Bachillerato______ 
f. Parte de la Universidad____ 
g. Universidad _____ 
h. Parte de una escuela técnico vocacional___ 
i. Escuela técnico vocacional _____  
 
28. ¿Tiene Ud. electricidad en su casa? 
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a. Sí, Siempre o Casi Siempre (Tiene luz más a menudo que no tiene luz por apagones etc.) 
_____ 
b. Sí, A veces  (Tiene luz menos a menudo que no tiene luz)  _____ 
c. NO, porque no nos alcanza el dinero  _____ 
d. NO, porque no está disponible ____ 
e. NO, otra razón  ______ 
 
29. ¿Tiene Ud. agua corriente en su casa? 
a. Sí, Siempre _____     b. A veces____     c.  NO _____ 
 
30. ¿Tiene Ud. servicio de teléfono en su casa?  
a. SÍ, Siempre (Tiene servicio más a menudo que no tiene por apagones etc.) _____ 
b. SÍ, A veces (No Tiene servicio mas a menudo que tiene) _____ 
c. NO, porque no nos alcanza el dinero  _____ 
d. NO, porque no está disponible ____ 
 
31. ¿Tiene acceso al uso de un móvil?  
a. SÍ, Siempre o Casi Siempre  _____ 
b. SÍ, a Veces _____ 
c. NO, Nunca_____ 
d. NO, porque no está disponible _____ 
e. NO, otra razón  ______ 
32. ¿En una escala del 1 a 8 qué tan religioso/a considera que es usted?   
(No soy religioso/a)      1       2       3       4        5       6        7         8    (Muy religioso/a)  
 
33. ¿Si es religioso/a, a que iglesia asiste?  
a. Católica ____ 
b. Protestante  
i. Bautista ____ 
ii. Pentecostal _____ 
iii. Adventista ____ 
iv. Otro Protestante ____  
c. Mormón ____ 
d. Testigo de Jehová ___  
e. Otro ________ 






34. ¿Participa Ud. en la solución de problemas de la comunidad? 
a. SÍ , siempre ___   b. SÍ , a menudo____    c. SÍ , a veces _____   d. NO, nunca ___ 
 
35. ¿El ser  asociada  de Esperanza, le ha permitido (o a su familia) recibir al menos un servicio 
de salud?  
  SÍ _____ NO ____   (Sí SÍ, señale cuales.)  
a. Prueba de Papanicolaou ___    b. Servicios odontológicos____ c. Charlas _____  c. Otros 
servicios____ 
 
ENTREVISTADOR/A: Muchísimas gracias por toda esa información, eso es muy útil. Ahora 





II.    DEMANDA DE CRÉDITO: 
ENTREVISTADOR/A: Por favor, continue a la SECCION SUPPLEMENTARIA sobre 
demanda de crédito.* 
 
 
<<POR FAVOR, SIGA A LA SECCION SUPPLEMENTARIA>> 
ESCOJA LA VARIANTE (De las 9)  QUE PRESENTE UN PRESTAMO MAS PARECIDO AL 
PRESTAMO DE LA ASOCIADA  
 
III.    FINANZAS Y GESTIÓN DE RIESGO 
36. Aparte de su préstamo con Esperanza ¿Tiene Ud. otra deuda? SÍ __NO __ 
a. Si SÍ , por favor indique la suma total que le debe a  los siguientes: 
i. Amigos  __________ 
ii. Parientes __________ 
iii. Prestamistas _________ 
iv. Organismos de Desarrollo __________ 
v. Bancos Comerciales _________ 
vi. Otros  (explique) _________________  
 
37. Por favor, indique las tasas de interés que ha conseguido o que CREE existe. Lo que cree 
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puede estar basada en tasas de interés que ha oído de amigos, parientes, u otras fuentes fiables. 




39. Si vendiera todo lo que tiene (negocio, casa, suelo, ganadería etc.) cuanto recibiría (en PESOS) 
___________________. (ENTREVISTADOR/A: Es posible que sea difícil de contestar, porque 
requiere valorizarlo todo. Si  la asociada no sabe o no entiende, escriba NO SABE.) 
 
40. Dada su presente situación financiera y sus ingresos ¿Qué piensa Ud. de su nivel de deuda?  
(Haga un círculo alrededor de la respuesta más apropiada). 
a. Muy Baja___ b. Baja ___  c. Razonable  ___ d. Alta ____e. Muy Alta ___ 
41. ¿Cuántas veces ha solicitado dinero a Bancos Comerciales u Organismos de Desarrollo 
(incluyendo a Esperanza) en el pasado? _____ 
 
42. ¿Cuántos préstamos ha recibido de Bancos Comerciales u Organismos de Desarrollo 




Si ha conseguido un 






Si NO ha 
conseguido un 











i.Amigos       
ii.Parientes     
iii.Prestamistas     
iv.Otros Organismos de 
Desarrollo  
   
v.Bancos Comerciales     
vi.Otros      
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43. Entre los prestamos que ha solicitado a Bancos Comerciales u Organismos de Desarrollo 
(incluyendo Esperanza)  en el pasado ¿Cuántas veces recibió el total de lo que había pedido? 
_____ 
 
44. En el pasado, ¿Le han negado un préstamo Bancos Comerciales u Organismos de Desarrollo 
(no incluyendo Esperanza)?  SÍ _______ NO_______ 
a. Si SÍ, cuales son las razones principales por las cuales no recibió Ud. un préstamo (contesta 
más de uno si aplica)  
i. Garantía insuficiente___________ 
ii. Su fuente mayor de ingresos  no era muy segura_________ 
iii. No haber pagado deudas en el pasado__________ 
iv. El Banco pensaba que yo no era confiable. ___________ 
v. El Organismo de Desarrollo o Banco Comercial pensaba que mis ingresos no eran 
suficientes para poder repagar la deuda ______ 
vi. El calendario de pago del Organismo de Desarrollo o Banco Comercial no correspondía a 
las ventas de su negocio ______ 
vii. No Sabe _______ 
 
45. ¿Alguna vez Ud. ha pagado tarde un préstamo a las opciones que siguen? 
(ENTREVISTADOR/A: Con ‘tarde’ queremos decir que pagó tarde, pero finalmente pagó) 
a. Pariente SÍ _____ NO ____ 
b. Amigo  SÍ _____ NO ____ 
c. Prestamista SÍ _____ NO ____ 
d. Esperanza         SÍ _____ NO ____ 
e. Organismo de Desarrollo (no incluyendo Esperanza) SÍ _____ NO ____ 
f. Banco Comercial SÍ _____ NO ____ 
g. Otro   SÍ _____ NO ____ 
 
 
46. ¿Ha faltado de pagar un préstamo alguna vez a las opciones que siguen?  
(ENTREVISTADOR/A: Queremos decir que nunca pagó el préstamo según el acuerdo con el 
prestamista). 
a. Pariente SÍ _____ NO ____ 
b. Amigo  SÍ _____ NO ____ 
c. Prestamista SÍ _____ NO ____ 
d. Esperanza         SÍ _____ NO ____ 
e. Organismo de Desarrollo (no incluyendo Esperanza) SÍ _____ NO ____ 
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f. Banco Comercial      SÍ _____    NO ____ 
g. Otro      SÍ _____ NO ____ 
 
47. ¿De quien recibió su último préstamo (NO incluyendo el préstamo actual que tiene con 
Esperanza)?  
a. Pariente_____  
b. Amigo  _____ 
c. Prestamista  _____  
d. Esperanza  _____ 
e. Organismo de Desarrollo (NO incluyendo el préstamo actual que tiene con Esperanza)? _____ 
f. Banco Comercial _____  
g. Otro_____ 
 
48. ¿ Cuál fue el propósito de ese último préstamo (NO incluyendo el préstamo actual que tiene 
con Esperanza)? (ENTREVISTADOR/A: Lee la siguiente lista) 
a. Desarrollo de su NEGOCIO____________ 
b. Salud/Medicina _______________ 
c. Boda ____________________ 
d. Funeral _______________ 
e. Costos Escolares  ________________ 
f. Agricultura (fertilizante, semillas, labor etc.) ______________ 
g. Maquinas y equipo ____________ 
h. Construcción de casa. _________________ 
i. Consumo del hogar __________________ 
j. Días festivos, vacaciones ______________________ 
k. Otro _______________________________ 
 
 
ENTREVISTADOR/A: Ahora quisiéramos preguntarle sobre el ambiente para préstamos en 
su comunidad. Por favor indique en una escala de 1 a 5 si esta ‘Muy de Acuerdo’ o ‘Muy en 
Desacuerdo con las declaraciones que siguen.  
 
 
(1) Muy de ACUERDO   (2) DE ACUERDO     (3)NEUTRAL   (4) EN 
DESACUERDO    (5)Muy en DESACUERDO 
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49. Esperanza es más flexible en términos de repago que otros 
Organismos de Desarrollo o Bancos Comerciales.  
1 2 3 4 5 
50. Los prestamistas son más flexibles en términos de repago 
que Esperanza, otros Organismos de Desarrollo o Bancos 
Comerciales. 
1 2 3 4 5 
51. Los parientes son más flexibles en términos de repago que 
Esperanza, otros Organismos de Desarrollo o Bancos 
Comerciales. 
1 2 3 4 5 
52. Los amigos son más flexibles en términos de repago que 
Esperanza, otros Organismos de Desarrollo o Bancos 
Comerciales. 
1 2 3 4 5 
53. Cuando se piden préstamos a parientes o amigos se les 
causa una dificultad económica. 
1 2 3 4 5 
54. Está dispuesta a pagar una tasa de interés mayor de la que 
ofrece Esperanza, otros  Organismos de Desarrollo o Bancos 
Comerciales para  obtener un préstamo. 
1 2 3 4 5 
55. Si presta dinero a un pariente, tiene CONFIANZA en que 
vaya a devolvérselo dentro de un periodo razonable de tiempo. 
1 2 3 4 5 
56. Si presta dinero a un amigo, tiene CONFIANZA en que vaya 
a devolvérselo dentro de un periodo razonable de tiempo. 
1 2 3 4 5 
57. Si un pariente le presta dinero a Ud., lo hace porque tiene 
CONFIANZA en que Ud. vaya a devolvérselo prestado dentro de 
un periodo razonable de tiempo. 
1 2 3 4 5 
58.  Si un amigo le presta dinero a Ud., lo hace porque tiene 
CONFIANZA en que vaya a devolvérselo prestado dentro de un 
periodo razonable de tiempo. 
1 2 3 4 5 
59. En su comunidad, ocurren préstamos informales entre 
amigos y parientes porque tienen CONFIANZA el uno en el 
otro.   
1 2 3 4 5 
60. Si Ud. tuviera dinero disponible, le prestaría dinero a un 
amigo o pariente aunque NO tenga CONFIANZA en que vayan 
a devolvérselo prestado 
1 2 3 4 5 
61. Aunque no tiene garantía, Esperanza le prestaría a Ud. 
porque tiene CONFIANZA que vaya a devolvérselo. 1 2 3 4 5 
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62. Aunque no tiene garantía, un Organismo de Desarrollo 
(no incluyendo Esperanza) le prestaría a Ud. porque tiene 
CONFIANZA en que vaya a devolvérselo. 
1 2 3 4 5 
63. Aunque no tiene garantía, un Banco Comercial le prestaría 
a Ud. porque tiene CONFIANZA en que Ud. vaya a devolvérselo. 
1 2 3 4 5 
64. Aunque no tiene garantía, un Prestamista le prestaría a Ud. 
porque tiene CONFIANZA en que Ud. vaya a devolvérselo. 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
65. Esto es una suposición. Imagine  que Ud. le debe 1,000 PESOS a Esperanza, 1,000 PESOS a 
otro Organismo de Desarrollo, 1,000 PESOS a un Banco Comercial, 1,000 PESOS a un 
Prestamista, 1,000 PESOS a un Amigo, y 1,000 PESOS a un Pariente, sumando a una deuda total 
de 6,000 PESOS. Suponga que solo tiene disponibles $1,000 PESOS para devolver los préstamos. 
¿Cuál de las siguientes opciones escogería? (Escoja solo uno) 
a. Devolvería primero el dinero al pariente.  ____ 
b. Devolvería primero el dinero al amigo. _____ 
c. Devolvería primero el dinero a Esperanza. _____ 
d. Devolvería primero el dinero al Organismo de Desarrollo (no incluyendo Esperanza). 
____ 
e. Devolvería primero el dinero al Banco Comercial. _____ 
f. Devolvería primero el dinero al Prestamista.  _____ 
g. Devolvería un poco de dinero a todos.  _____ 
 
IV.    MODELO DE LA LIMITACIÓN DE CRÉDITO 
ENTREVISTADOR/A: Muchísimas gracias por su paciencia. Con las preguntas que siguen 
quisiéramos entender la dificultad o facilidad para conseguir un préstamo. Por favor indique en 
una escala de 1 a 5 si esta ‘Muy de Acuerdo’ o ‘Muy en Desacuerdo con las declaraciones que 
siguen. 
(1) Muy de ACUERDO   (2) DE ACUERDO     (3)NEUTRAL   (4) EN 
DESACUERDO    (5)Muy en DESACUERDO 
66. Esperanza le prestó dinero que no podía recibir en otro lugar.   1 2 3 4 5 
67. Esperanza le prestó menos de lo que hubiera querido.  1 2 3 4 5 
68. Si tuviera más propiedades, podría pedir prestado más dinero a 
un Organismo de Desarrollo o un Banco Comercial sin usar su 
1 2 3 4 5 
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propiedad como garantía.   
69. Si tuviera más propiedades, podría pedir prestado más dinero a 
un Organismo de Desarrollo o un Banco Comercial, pero solo si usara 
esa propiedad como garantía.  
1 2 3 4 5 
70. Si tuviera más propiedades, podría pedir prestado más dinero a 
un Organismo de Desarrollo o un Banco Comercial con una tasa de 
interés más baja, y sin usar su propiedad como garantía. 
1 2 3 4 5 
71. Si tuviera más propiedades, podría pedir prestado más dinero a un 
Organismo de Desarrollo o un Banco Comercial con una tasa de 
interés más baja, pero solo si usara su propiedad como garantía.   
1 2 3 4 5 
 
V.       IMPACTO DE LA LIMITACIÓN DE CRÉDITO  
ENTREVISTADOR/A: Aquí vamos a preguntar sobre "limitaciones de préstamo." Con este 
término queremos decir que  la asociada  no puede obtener todo el dinero que le ha pedido 
prestado. Por favor indique en una escala de 1 a 5 si esta ‘Muy de Acuerdo’ o ‘Muy en 
Desacuerdo con las declaraciones que siguen. 
(1) Muy de ACUERDO   (2) DE ACUERDO     (3)NEUTRAL   (4) EN 
DESACUERDO    (5)Muy en DESACUERDO 
72. Si me conceden un crédito insuficiente (menos de lo que 
pide) no puedo maximizar las ganancias de su negocio.   
1 2 3 4 5 
73. Con un crédito insuficiente (menos de lo que pide), 
necesitaría ingresos  procedentes de empleos fuera de su 
negocio.  
1 2 3 4 5 
74. Con un crédito insuficiente (menos de lo que pide), no 
podría proveer a mis niños una buena educación ni cuidado 
médico.  
1 2 3 4 5 
75. Con un crédito insuficiente (menos de lo que pide), su 
familia y yo no podríamos comer lo suficiente por un año.  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
76. Si pudiera pedirle prestado dinero suficiente a un Organismo de Crédito o Banco Comercial 
¿Qué haría Ud.? 
a. Mudarle a un pueblo más grande o a una ciudad, y empezar otro negocio que le dé más 
dinero allí. ____  




VI.      PREGUNTAS DE CULPA  
ENTREVISTADOR/A: Gracias tanto. Ahora vamos a la próxima sección. Aqui quisiéramos 
pedirle responder en una escala del 1 a 8. 
 
77. ¿Alguna vez, ha faltado de pagar Ud. un préstamo a un pariente? SÍ ___  NO ____ 
a. Si SÍ, ¿Cuan culpable se sentía Ud.?   
(No me sentía culpable)  1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8   (Muy culpable) 
b. Si NO, ¿Cuan culpable se sentiría Ud. si no hubiera pagado? 
(No me sentía culpable)  1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8   (Muy culpable) 
 
78. ¿Alguna vez, no ha pagado Ud. un préstamo a un vecino?  SÍ ___  NO ____ 
a. Si SÍ, ¿Cuan culpable se sentía Ud.?   
(No me sentía culpable)  1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8   (Muy culpable) 
b. Si NO, ¿Cuan culpable se sentiría Ud. si no hubiera pagado? 
(No me sentía culpable)  1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8   (Muy culpable) 
 
79. ¿Alguna vez, no ha pagado Ud. un préstamo a Esperanza o a otro Organismo de Desarrollo? 
SÍ ___  NO ____ 
a. Si SÍ, ¿Cuan culpable se sentía Ud.?   
(No me sentía culpable)  1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8   (Muy culpable) 
b. Si NO, ¿Cuan culpable se sentiría Ud. si no hubiera pagado? 
(No me sentiría culpable)  1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8   (Muy culpable) 
 
80. ¿Alguna vez, no ha pagado Ud. un préstamo a un Banco Comercial?         
SÍ ___  NO ____ 
a. Si SÍ, ¿Cuan culpable se sentía Ud.?   
(No me sentía culpable)  1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8   (Muy culpable) 
b. Si NO, ¿Cuan culpable se sentiría Ud. si no hubiera pagado? 
(No me sentiría culpable)  1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    (Muy culpable) 
 
81. ¿Alguna vez, no ha pagado Ud. un préstamo a un Prestamista? SÍ ___  NO ____ 
a. Si SÍ, ¿Cuán culpable se sentía Ud.?   
(No me sentía culpable)  1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8   (Muy culpable) 
b. Si NO, ¿Cuán culpable se sentiría Ud. si no hubiera pagado? 




82. En una escal de 1 a 5 ¿ Cree que su capacidad de pagar un préstamo a Esperanza se ve 
afectada por la época del año?  
  (SI)    1     2     3    4    5   (NO)  
 
83. Suponiendo que su capacidad de pagar un préstamo a Esperanza está afectada por la época 
del año, o que la capacidad de otros está afectada ¿Esto se debe a cuales de las siguientes 
opciones? (Escoja todas que aplican) 
a. Tiempo _____ 
b. Un cambio en el número de Turistas   
c. La Cosecha_____ 
d. Cambio de Gobierno_____ 
e. Gastos de sus Dependientes (escuela etc.) _____ 
f. Días de Fiesta, eventos de la comunidad_______ 
g. Enfermedades _________ 
h. Otros __ 
84. En una escala de 1 a 5 ¿Afecta su capacidad de pagar un préstamo a Esperanza el asesor que 
tiene asignado?   
            (Si)   1     2     3    4    5   (No)  
 
85. ¿Cuántas veces ha llegado tarde su asesor/a actual a una reunión?  
a. Nunca ______      b. Pocas Veces _____       c. Muchas Veces _____      d. Siempre _____ 
 
86. Cuantas veces ha llegado tarde más de cinco asociados de su banco a una reunión?  
a. Nunca ______      b. Pocas Veces _____       c. Muchas Veces _____      d. Siempre _____ 
 
87. En una escala de 1 a 5 ¿Considera Ud. que su asesor es una persona honesta? 
 (SI)   1     2     3    4    5   (No)  
 
88. En una escala de 1 a 5 ¿Está al tanto de cómo va su negocio su asesor? 
 (SI)   1     2     3    4    5   (No)  
 
89. Su asesor le ha visitado al menos una vez entre reuniones. SÍ _____  NO _______ 
 





91. ¿Que parte de los ingresos de su hogar puede ahorrar en un año? 
a. Nada  ____    b. Menos de 5% _____  c.  Entre 5 y 10% _____  d. Más de 10% 
____ 
 
92. ¿Cuál de las siguientes posibilidades describe mejor donde guarda sus ahorros? (Solo escoja 
una por favor)  
a. En una cuenta bancaria de un Banco Comercial creado por Esperanza______ 
b. En una cuenta en un Banco Comercial no creado por Esperanza ____ 
c. En una cuenta en otro Organismo de Desarrollo______ 
d. En una cooperativa  ______ 
e. En la casa ______ 
f. Con familia y/o amigos ______ 
g. No  tiene  ahorros ______ 
 
93. Si recibe más ingresos ¿Cuales de las siguientes posibilidades escogería? (seleccione solo uno) 
a. Ahorraría menos e invertiría más en su negocio______ 
b. Ahorraría menos y compraría más para su hogar y/o consumo______ 
c. Ahorraría menos y gastaría en viajes o vacaciones ______ 
d. Ahorraría lo mismo_______ 
e. Ahorraría más_______ 
f. Ahorraría mucho más_____ 
 
94. En una escala de 1 a 5 ¿Puede conseguir los préstamos que necesita de Organismos de 
Desarrollo y Bancos Comerciales para propósitos de CONSUMO,  EDUCACIÓN, y/o SALUD? 
 (SI)   1     2     3    4    5   (NO)  
 
95. Cuando no puede conseguir un préstamo de un Organismo de Desarrollo o un Banco para 
utilizarlo a fines de su negocio, ¿A quien pide dinero?  
a. Prestamistas____ 
b. Amigos ________ 
c. Parientes ________ 
 
96. En una escala de 1 a 5 ¿Puede conseguir los préstamos que necesito de Organismos de 
Desarrollo y Bancos Comerciales para  propósitos de su NEGOCIO?  




97. Cuando no puede conseguir un préstamo de un Organismo de Desarrollo para utilizarlo a 
fines de CONSUMO,  EDUCACIÓN, y/o SALUD ¿A quien pide dinero?  
a. Prestamistas____ 
b. Amigos ________ 
c. Parientes ________ 
 
ENTREVISTADOR/A: Muchas Gracias.  Por favor, para las preguntas que siguen indique en 
una escala de 1 a 5 si esta ‘Muy de Acuerdo’ o ‘Muy en Desacuerdo con las declaraciones. 
 
VII.     DINÁMICA DE PRÉSTAMOS DE GRUPO 
103. ¿Cuantos préstamos de grupo ha conseguido de Esperanza? ________  
 
104. ¿Cuántos grupos ha tenido?  ____ 
a.    Si ha sido miembro de más de un grupo, ¿cuáles fueron las razones por cambiar de 
grupo?      
          (Escoja todos los que apliquen) 
i.El grupo creció y lo dividieron_____ 
ii.Me mudé____ 
iii.Tenía algún problema con un miembro del grupo _____ 
(1) Muy de ACUERDO   (2) DE ACUERDO     (3)NEUTRAL   (4) EN 
DESACUERDO    (5)Muy en DESACUERDO 
98. Si no podría pagar un préstamo de un Organismo de Desarrollo, 
Banco Comercial, amigo o pariente,  seria por falta de recursos.  
1 2 3 4 5 
99. Si no podría pagar un préstamo de un Organismo de Desarrollo, 
Banco Comercial, amigo o pariente, seria por no entender los términos 
del acuerdo.   
1 2 3 4 5 
100. Si no podría pagar un préstamo de un Organismo de Desarrollo, 
Banco Comercial, amigo o pariente,  sería el  resultado de pérdidas en su 
negocio.  
1 2 3 4 5 
101. Si no podría pagar un préstamo de un Organismo de Desarrollo, 
Banco Comercial, amigo o pariente,  sería un  resultado de una muerte o 
enfermedad en su familia.  
1 2 3 4 5 
102. Si no podría pagar un préstamo de un Organismo de Desarrollo, 
Banco Comercial, amigo o pariente,  sería el  resultado de usar el dinero 
para otro propósito.  
1 2 3 4 5 
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iv.Tenía algún problema con varios miembros del grupo ____ 
v.Otro ____ 
b. Si ha sido miembro de más de un grupo, por lo general, ¿Qué tan bien conocía a los 
miembros de sus grupos? 
i.Muy bien ___   
ii.Bien ____  
iii.No muy bien ___  
iv.Nada ____ 
 
105. ¿Qué tan bien conoce Ud. a los miembros de su grupo actual? 
a. Muy bien ___   
b. Bien ____  
c. No muy bien ___  
d. Nada ____ 
e. No Importa ___ 
 
106. En una escala de 1 a 5 ¿Prefiere Ud que los miembros de su grupo fueran parientes? 
  (SI)   1     2     3    4    5   (NO) 
 
107. En una escala de 1 a 5 ¿Ha estado contenta con su experiencia con los miembros de su grupo/s 
en general? 
  (SI)   1     2     3    4    5   (NO) 
 
108. Por favor describa la formación de su grupo actual, escogiendo una de las siguientes 
opciones.  
a. Escogí todos los miembros ___  
b. Escogí algunos de los miembros ____ 
c. Alguien me pidió juntarme al grupo ___ 
d. El Asesor me designó un grupo ____ 
e. Otro (por favor describa) ___________________________ 
 
109. Alguna vez, ha dejado de pago su cuota completa a tiempo a Esperanza? SÍ ____ NO _____ 
a. ¿Ha dejado de pagar uno de los miembros su quota completa a tiempo?  SÍ ____ NO 
_____ 
 




111. ¿Alguna vez, ha faltado de pagar una cuota completa a tiempo a Esperanza su grupo? SÍ ____ 
NO _____ 
 
a. Si SÍ ¿Pagaron la cuota los miembros de su grupo o de su Banco de Esperanza? SÍ __ 
NO___ 
 
112. Si su grupo no ha pagado una cuota a tiempo ¿Con cuántos días de retraso lo hizo? ____         
Nunca pagamos___ 
 
113. En una escala de 1 a 5 ¿Qué tipo de préstamo prefiere Ud.?       
   (Individual)  1       2       3       4       5      (Grupo)  
 
114. ¿Quiere conseguir préstamos de Esperanza en el futuro? SÍ ___ NO ___  NO SABE ___ 
 
115. Si SÍ ¿Cuántos préstamos  quiere conseguir de Esperanza? 
a. Por lo menos 1 ____    b. Menos de 5_____      c. Más de 5 _____  
 
116. Si NO ¿Quiere conseguir préstamos de otros? SÍ ___ NO ____  
 
117. Si quiere conseguir prestamos de otros en el futuro ¿De quién piense conseguir préstamos? 
a. Amigos _____  
b. Parientes ____  
c. Prestamistas ___  
d. Organismos de Desarrollo (No incluyendo Esperanza) ___  
e. Bancos Comerciales ___  
f. Otros  ______  
 
118. ¿Espera poder pagar todo el préstamo actual a Esperanza?  
a. Sí a tiempo ______  b. Pagar pero tarde ______    c. No creo que pueda ______  
 
 
ENTREVISTADOR/A: Muchísimas gracias, eso es muy útil. Ahora quisiera preguntarle sobre 
su actitud hacia riesgo y los riesgos que encuentra en su negocio. 




119. Por favor, en una escala de 1 a 5, indique si está dispuesta a arriesgarse en la manera que 




120. Por favor indique que tan importantes Ud. cree que es cada punto en términos de la gestión 
de riesgo en su negocio en una escala 1 = no es importante, 2 = menos  importante, 3 = neutral, 
4 = importante, and 5 = muy importante (Haga un círculo  alrededor de la repuesta más 














































a. Esta dispuesta a  aceptar riesgos más altos 
para aumentar la posibilidad de mayores 
ganancias  
1 2 3 4 5 
b. Esta dispuesta a  aceptar riesgos con nuevas 
empresas o tecnologías antes de ver resultados 
buenos entre otros  
1 2 3 4 5 
c. Esta dispuesta a  aceptar riesgos con nuevas 
prácticas administrativas antes de ver 
resultados buenos entre otros.  







121. Imagine que un desconocido honesto le ofrezca una apuesta con un pago que depende de 
echar una moneda a la suerte. Si la moneda cae cara, gana Ud. la suma en la primera columna, y 
si cae cruz, gana Ud. la suma en la segunda columna. Si lo hace varias veces, ganaría la suma en 








Beneficios con   
MALA suerte 
(PESOS) 
Beneficios después de  
jugar varias veces 
(PESOS) 
1. 500 500 500 
2. 950 450 700 
3. 1200 400 800 
4. 1500 300 900 
5. 1900 100 1000 
6. 2000 0 1000 

































a. Mantener más de una empresa (Diversificación 
de negocios) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
b. Clientes en locales diferentes (Diversificación 
geográfica) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
c. Vender cada producto tras tiempo (un poco 
cada día) y no todo a la vez  (Diversificación de 
marketing) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
d. Usar acuerdos para comercializar su producto 
por adelantado a un precio fijo  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
f. Mantener reservas financieras, dinero en 
efectivo y propiedades que vender 
fácilmente/rapidamente 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
g. Invertir en otras fuentes de ingresos  1 2 3 4 5 
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ENTREVISTADOR/A: ¡Gracias tanto por su paciencia! Hemos completado la encuesta entera. 
 
Demand Supplement, Spanish Version. Sample Loan Variant (3000 Pesos DR).  
 





Sexo:    M ____   F _____ 
 
ENTREVISTADOR/A: Primero, quisiéramos preguntarle sobre los tipos de préstamos que 
prefieres y quieres.  
8) Considerando su préstamo actual, cuales de las siguientes opciones quisiera Ud. si la 
tasa de interés CRECIERA? 
a) Conseguir un Préstamo MAS GRANDE ______ 
b) Conseguir un Préstamo MAS PEQUEÑO ______ 
c) Conseguir el MISMO Préstamo ______ 
d) No sé  ______ 
 
9) Considerando su préstamo actual, cuales de las siguientes opciones quisiera Ud. si la 
tasa de interés DISMINUYERA? 
a) Conseguir un Préstamo MAS GRANDE ______ 
b) Conseguir un Préstamo MAS PEQUEÑO ______ 
c) Conseguir el MISMO Préstamo ______ 
d) No sé ______ 
 
10) Cuales de las siguientes opciones mejor describen lo que ha hecho y va a hacer con su 
préstamo actual? Por Favor, escoja todo que aplica.  
a) Productos para el negocio ____ 
b) Contratar nuevos empleados _____ 
c) Comprar  ingredientes, maquinaria, o equipos que es necesario cambiar varias veces al 
año _____ 
d) Comprar ingredientes, maquinaria, o equipo que es necesario cambiar solo una vez al 
año  ___ 
e) No pienso invertirlo en el negocio ___ 
 
11) En una escala de 1 a 5, prefiere pagar CUOTAS  IGUALES?  
          (No, No Prefiero)      1   2    3    4     5       (Si, Prefiero)  
 
12) En una escala de 1 a 5, prefiere pagar CUOTAS  MAS GRANDES AL PRINCIPIO de 
su préstamo?  
          (No, No Prefiero)      1   2    3    4     5       (Si, Prefiero)  
 
 
13) En una escala de 1 a 5, prefiere pagar CUOTAS  MAS GRANDES AL FIN de su 
préstamo?  
(No, No Prefiero)      1   2    3    4     5       (Si, Prefiero) 
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ENTREVISTADOR/A: Ahora todas las preguntas que siguen deben responderse suponiendo 
que tiene un prestamo de  3000 PESOS por 6 MESES.  
 
14) Suponga que ha conseguido ese préstamo de 3000 por 6 meses. Ahora suponga que la 
tasa de interés creciera  de  4% a 8% al mes, o al 96% annual. Esto significa que pagará a razon 
de 60 PESOS MÁS por cuota. Con esta tasa de interés, y usando el dinero para exactamente lo 
que nos dijo antes,  cuales de los siguientes prestamos quisiera, si pudiera conseguir lo que 
quiera. (Por favor escoja SI o NO en cada caso, A-L) 
 
 OPCION DE 
PRESTAMO NUEVO 
PAGO BI-SEMANAL 
(a razon de) 
PAGO TOTAL  
POR 
 INTERSES  
SI NO 
A  $3,000   $325  $924   
B  $2,700   $293  $829   
C  $2,400   $260  $737   
D  $2,100   $228  $645   
E  $1,800   $195  $553   
F  $1,500   $163  $461   
G  $1,200   $130  $368   
H  $900   $98  $276   
I  $600   $65  $184   




15) Suponga que ha conseguido ese préstamo de 3000 por 6 meses. Ahora suponga que la 
tasa de interés creciera  de  4% a 7% al mes, o al 84% annual. Esto significa que pagará a razon 
de 45  PESOS MÁS por cuota. Con esta tasa de interés, y usando el dinero para exactamente lo 
que nos dijo antes,  cuales de los siguientes prestamos quisiera, si pudiera conseguir lo que 
quiera. (Por favor escoja SI o NO en cada caso, A-K) 





(a razon de) 
PAGO 
TOTAL  POR 
 INTERSES  
SI NO 
A  $3,000   $315  $800   
B  $2,775   $292  $740   
C  $2,550   $268  $681   
D  $2,325   $244  $620   
E  $2,100   $221  $560   
F  $1,875   $197  $499   
G  $1,650   $174  $439   
H  $1,425   $150  $380   
I  $1,200   $126  $320   
J  $975   $103  $259   






16) Suponga que ha conseguido ese préstamo de 3000 PESOS por 6 meses.  Ahora suponga 
que la tasa de interés creciera de  4% a 6% al mes, o a 72% annual. Esto significa que pagara a 
razon de 30 PESOS MÁS por cuota. Con esta tasa de interés, y usando el dinero para 
exactamente lo que nos dijo antes, cuales de los siguientes préstamos quisiera, si pudiera 









 INTERSES  
SI NO 
A  $3,000   $306  $679   
B  $2,850   $290  $646   
C  $2,700   $275  $611   
D  $2,550   $260  $578   
E  $2,400   $245  $543   
F  $2,250   $229  $510   
G  $2,100   $214  $475   
H  $1,950   $199  $442   
I  $1,800   $184  $407   
J  $1,650   $168  $374   
K  $1,500   $153  $339   
L  $1,125   $115  $255   
M  $750   $77  $169   




17) Suponga que ha conseguido ese préstamo de 3000 PESOS por 6 meses.  Ahora suponga 
que la tasa de interés creciera de 4% a 5% al mes, o al 60% annual. Esto significa que pagara a 
razon de 15  PESOS MÁS por cuota. Con esta tasa de interés, y usando el dinero para 
exactamente lo que nos dijo antes, cuales de los siguientes prestamos quisiera, si pudiera 
conseguir lo que quiera. (Por Favor escoja SI o NO en cada caso, A-O)  
 OPCION DE 
PRESTAMO NUEVO 
PAGO BI-SEMANAL 
(a razon de) 
PAGO TOTAL  POR 
 INTERSES  SI NO 
A  $3,000   $296  $561   
B  $2,925   $289  $547   
C  $2,850   $281  $533   
D  $2,775   $274  $520   
E  $2,700   $266  $506   
F  $2,625   $259  $491   
G  $2,550   $252  $477   
H  $2,475   $244  $463   
I  $2,400   $237  $449   
J  $2,325   $230  $434   
K  $2,250   $222  $421   
L  $2,063   $204  $386   
M  $1,875   $185  $350   
N  $1,688   $167  $316   






18) Suponga que ha conseguido ese préstamo de 3000 PESOS por 6 meses. Ahora suponga 
que la tasa de interés dismunyera de  4% a 3% al mes, o al 36% annual. Esto significa que 
pagara a razon de 15   PESOS MENOS por cuota. Con esta tasa de interés, y usando el dinero 
para exactamente lo que nos dijo antes, cuales de los siguientes prestamos quisiera, si pudiera 










 INTERSES  
SI NO 
A  $3,000   $277  $331   
B  $3,075   $284  $339   
C  $3,150   $291  $347   
D  $3,225   $298  $355   
E  $3,300   $305  $364   
F  $3,375   $312  $372   
G  $3,450   $319  $381   
H  $3,525   $326  $389   
I  $3,600   $333  $397   
J  $3,675   $340  $405   
K  $3,750   $347  $413   
L  $3,938   $364  $435   
M  $4,125   $381  $455   
N  $4,313   $399  $476   
O  $4,500   $416  $497   
 
19) Suponga que ha conseguido ese préstamo de 3000 PESOS por 6 meses.  Ahora suponga 
que la tasa de interés dismunyera de   4% a 2% al mes, o al 24% annual. Esto significa que 
pagara a razon de 30  PESOS MENOS por cuota. Con esta tasa de interés, y usando el dinero 
para exactamente lo que nos dijo antes, cuales de los siguientes préstamos quisiera, si pudiera 
conseguir lo que quiera. (Por Favor escoja SI o NO en cada caso, A-O)  
 OPCION DE 
PRESTAMO NUEVO 
PAGO BI-SEMANAL 
(a razon de) 
PAGO TOTAL  
POR 
 INTERSES  
SI NO 
A $3,000 $268 $218   
B $3,150 $282 $229   
C $3,300 $295 $240   
D $3,450 $308 $251   
E $3,600 $322 $262   
F $3,750 $335 $273   
G $3,900 $349 $284   
H $4,050 $362 $295   
I $4,200 $375 $306   
J $4,350 $389 $317   
K $4,500 $402 $328   
L $4,875 $436 $355   
M $5,250 $469 $382   
N $5,625 $503 $410   





20) Suponga que ha conseguido ese préstamo de 3000 PESOS por 6 meses. Ahora suponga 
que la tasa de interés dismunyera de 4% a 1% al mes, o al 12% annual. Esto significa que pagara 
a razon de 45  PESOS MENOS por cuota. Con esta tasa de interés, y usando el dinero para 
exactamente lo que nos dijo antes,  cuales de los siguientes prestamos quisiera, si pudiera 
conseguir lo que quiera. (Por Favor escoja SI o NO en cada caso, A-O)  
 OPCION DE 
PRESTAMO NUEVO 
PAGO BI-SEMANAL 
(a razon de) 
PAGO TOTAL  POR 
 INTERSES  SI NO 
A  $3,000   $259  $108   
B  $3,225   $279  $116   
C  $3,450   $298  $124   
D  $3,675   $318  $132   
E  $3,900   $337  $141   
F  $4,125   $356  $149   
G  $4,350   $376  $157   
H  $4,575   $395  $165   
I  $4,800   $415  $173   
J  $5,025   $434  $181   
K  $5,250   $453  $189   
L  $5,813   $502  $210   
M  $6,375   $550  $230   
N  $6,938   $599  $250   
O  $7,500   $648  $271   
 
21) Suponga que ha conseguido un préstamo de 3000 PESOS por 6 meses. Ahora suponga 
que la tasa de interés dismunyera de 4% a 0% al mes. Esto significa que pagara a razon de 60 
PESOS MENOS por cuota. Con esta tasa de interés, y usando el dinero para exactamente lo 
que nos dijo antes, cuales de los siguientes préstamos quisiera, si pudiera conseguir lo que 










(a razon de) 
PAGO TOTAL  POR 
 INTERSES  SI 
A  $3,000   $250    
B  $3,300   $275    
C  $3,600   $300    
D  $3,900   $325    
E  $4,200   $350    
F  $4,500   $375    
G  $4,800   $400    
H  $5,100   $425    
I  $5,400   $450    
J  $5,700   $475    
K  $6,000   $500    
L  $6,750   $563    
M  $7,500   $625    
N  $8,250   $688    







STATA Code  
 
 
/*drop variables with no client id*/ 
drop if best_e_zero_abs== . 
 
//- Variables by Branch-// 
 
/*To summarize elasticity by branch*/ 
bysort branchcode: summarize best_e_zero_abs 
/*To summarize characteristics by branch*/ 
bysort branchcode: summarize age_cs educ voc_training haitian_relatives 
loan_machine LinearElasticity_zero ConstantElasticity_zero Inc_ownbusiness 
Inc_paidwork Inc_notregular Inc_remittances es_sales_5000_10000 
credit_con_scale debt_scale inc_risks interest_aware DecRate_More  
DecRate_Same  DecRate_Less  IncRate_More  IncRate_Same  IncRate_Less 
ContainsNONE 
bysort branchcode: summarize age_cs educ voc_training haitian_relatives 
loan_machine LinearElasticity_zero ConstantElasticity_zero Inc_ownbusiness 
Inc_paidwork Inc_notregular Inc_remittances es_sales_5000_10000 
credit_con_scale debt_scale inc_risks interest_aware DecRate_More  
DecRate_Same  DecRate_Less  IncRate_More  IncRate_Same  IncRate_Less 





sktest best_e_zero_abs if hm == 1 
/*San Pedro*/ 
sktest best_e_zero_abs if spm == 1 
/*Alcarrizos*/ 
sktest best_e_zero_abs if alc == 1 
/*Guaricanos*/ 
sktest best_e_zero_abs if gua == 1 
/*Puerto Plata*/ 
sktest best_e_zero_abs if pp== 1 
/*Seybo*/ 
sktest best_e_zero_abs if sey ==  
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//--- Main Models -----// 
 
/*OLS (1)*/ 
regress best_e_zero_abs age_cs educ voc_training dep_elem water_scale 
haitian_relatives Inc_ownbusiness Inc_paidwork savings_none_5p savings_5_10p 
es_savings_0_500 es_savings_500_1000 religious_rating community_scale 
Amount_disbursed Installment Eff__Rate Voluntary_savings  esp_health 
loan_machine es_sales_0_5000 es_sales_5000_10000 es_sales_10000_15000 
es_sales_15000_20000 es_sales_20000_more sum_amount_disbursed_lc 
debt_othr loans_rec loan_paid_late debt_scale esp_rationing_scale 
credit_ration_food_agree credit_con_scale credit_busns_scale inc_risks 
interest_aware IncRate_More IncRate_Less DecRate_More DecRate_Less 
treatment_a interview_meeting Loan_Var_Diff Time_between_surveys 
ContainsNONE individual male var_length hm spm alc gua pp Mirna Astia 
Lourdes Emmanuel Esmeida Gabriela Maira Maximo MiguelinaArrendel Reina 
Yrene Fabia  
note: Miguelina omitted because of collinearity 
estimates store Model_1, title(Full Dataset (1)) 
 
/*OLS (2)*/ 
regress best_e_zero_abs age_cs educ voc_training dep_elem water_scale 
haitian_relatives Inc_ownbusiness Inc_paidwork savings_none_5p savings_5_10p 
es_savings_0_500 es_savings_500_1000 religious_rating community_scale 
Amount_disbursed Installment Eff__Rate Voluntary_savings  esp_health 
loan_machine es_sales_0_5000 es_sales_5000_10000 es_sales_10000_15000 
es_sales_15000_20000 es_sales_20000_more sum_amount_disbursed_lc 
debt_othr loans_rec loan_paid_late debt_scale esp_rationing_scale 
credit_ration_food_agree credit_con_scale credit_busns_scale inc_risks 
interest_aware IncRate_More IncRate_Less DecRate_More DecRate_Less 
treatment_a interview_meeting Loan_Var_Diff Time_between_surveys 
ContainsNONE individual male var_length hm spm alc gua pp, tsscons 
estimates store Model_3, title(Full Dataset (3))  
 
/*Tobit (3)*/ 
Tobit best_e_zero_abs age_cs educ voc_training dep_elem water_scale 
haitian_relatives Inc_ownbusiness Inc_paidwork savings_none_5p savings_5_10p 
es_savings_0_500 es_savings_500_1000 religious_rating community_scale 
Amount_disbursed Installment Eff__Rate Voluntary_savings  esp_health 
loan_machine es_sales_0_5000 es_sales_5000_10000 es_sales_10000_15000 
es_sales_15000_20000 es_sales_20000_more sum_amount_disbursed_lc 
debt_othr loans_rec loan_paid_late debt_scale esp_rationing_scale 
credit_ration_food_agree credit_con_scale credit_busns_scale inc_risks 
interest_aware IncRate_More IncRate_Less DecRate_More DecRate_Less 
treatment_a interview_meeting Loan_Var_Diff Time_between_surveys 
ContainsNONE individual male var_length hm spm alc gua pp Mirna Astia 
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Lourdes Emmanuel Esmeida Gabriela Maira Maximo MiguelinaArrendel Reina 
Yrene Fabia, ll(0) ul(2)  
note: Fabia omitted because of collinearity      
estimates store Tobit_Model_5 
 
/*Tobit (4)*/ 
Tobit best_e_zero_abs age_cs educ voc_training dep_elem water_scale 
haitian_relatives Inc_ownbusiness Inc_paidwork savings_none_5p savings_5_10p 
es_savings_0_500 es_savings_500_1000 religious_rating community_scale 
Amount_disbursed Installment Eff__Rate Voluntary_savings  esp_health 
loan_machine es_sales_0_5000 es_sales_5000_10000 es_sales_10000_15000 
es_sales_15000_20000 es_sales_20000_more sum_amount_disbursed_lc 
debt_othr loans_rec loan_paid_late debt_scale esp_rationing_scale 
credit_ration_food_agree credit_con_scale credit_busns_scale inc_risks 
interest_aware IncRate_More IncRate_Less DecRate_More DecRate_Less 
treatment_a interview_meeting Loan_Var_Diff Time_between_surveys 
ContainsNONE individual male var_length hm spm alc gua pp, ll(0) ul(2)  
estimates store Tobit_Model_7 
 
estout *, varwidth(50) cells(b(star fmt(3)) se(par(`"="("'`")""') fmt(3))) legend 
postfoot("Notes: Ordinary Least Squares model reported; standard errors in 
parentheses.") label collabels(none)  varlabels(_cons Constant) title("Table 6-
Elasticity of Demand for Credit") 
estimates clear 
 
//--- Main Models -----// 
//--Robustness Check --// 
 
drop if  Date_Esp_Survey > Date_Cornell_Survey 
 
/*OLS (5)*/ 
regress best_e_zero_abs age_cs educ voc_training dep_elem water_scale 
haitian_relatives Inc_ownbusiness Inc_paidwork savings_none_5p savings_5_10p 
es_savings_0_500 es_savings_500_1000 religious_rating community_scale 
Amount_disbursed Installment Eff__Rate Voluntary_savings  esp_health 
loan_machine es_sales_0_5000 es_sales_5000_10000 es_sales_10000_15000 
es_sales_15000_20000 es_sales_20000_more sum_amount_disbursed_lc 
debt_othr loans_rec loan_paid_late debt_scale esp_rationing_scale 
credit_ration_food_agree credit_con_scale credit_busns_scale inc_risks 
interest_aware IncRate_More IncRate_Less DecRate_More DecRate_Less 
treatment_a interview_meeting Loan_Var_Diff Time_between_surveys 
ContainsNONE individual male var_length hm spm alc gua pp Mirna Astia 
Lourdes Emmanuel Esmeida Gabriela Maira Maximo MiguelinaArrendel Reina 
Yrene Fabia  
note: Miguelina omitted because of collinearity 
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estimates store Model_1, title(Full Dataset (1)) 
 
/*OLS (6)*/ 
regress best_e_zero_abs age_cs educ voc_training dep_elem water_scale 
haitian_relatives Inc_ownbusiness Inc_paidwork savings_none_5p savings_5_10p 
es_savings_0_500 es_savings_500_1000 religious_rating community_scale 
Amount_disbursed Installment Eff__Rate Voluntary_savings  esp_health 
loan_machine es_sales_0_5000 es_sales_5000_10000 es_sales_10000_15000 
es_sales_15000_20000 es_sales_20000_more sum_amount_disbursed_lc 
debt_othr loans_rec loan_paid_late debt_scale esp_rationing_scale 
credit_ration_food_agree credit_con_scale credit_busns_scale inc_risks 
interest_aware IncRate_More IncRate_Less DecRate_More DecRate_Less 
treatment_a interview_meeting Loan_Var_Diff Time_between_surveys 
ContainsNONE individual male var_length hm spm alc gua pp, tsscons 
estimates store Model_3, title(Full Dataset (3))  
 
/*Tobit (7)*/ 
Tobit best_e_zero_abs age_cs educ voc_training dep_elem water_scale 
haitian_relatives Inc_ownbusiness Inc_paidwork savings_none_5p savings_5_10p 
es_savings_0_500 es_savings_500_1000 religious_rating community_scale 
Amount_disbursed Installment Eff__Rate Voluntary_savings  esp_health 
loan_machine es_sales_0_5000 es_sales_5000_10000 es_sales_10000_15000 
es_sales_15000_20000 es_sales_20000_more sum_amount_disbursed_lc 
debt_othr loans_rec loan_paid_late debt_scale esp_rationing_scale 
credit_ration_food_agree credit_con_scale credit_busns_scale inc_risks 
interest_aware IncRate_More IncRate_Less DecRate_More DecRate_Less 
treatment_a interview_meeting Loan_Var_Diff Time_between_surveys 
ContainsNONE individual male var_length hm spm alc gua pp Mirna Astia 
Lourdes Emmanuel Esmeida Gabriela Maira Maximo MiguelinaArrendel Reina 
Yrene Fabia, ll(0) ul(2)  
note: Fabia omitted because of collinearity      
estimates store Tobit_Model_5 
 
/*Tobit (8)*/ 
Tobit best_e_zero_abs age_cs educ voc_training dep_elem water_scale 
haitian_relatives Inc_ownbusiness Inc_paidwork savings_none_5p savings_5_10p 
es_savings_0_500 es_savings_500_1000 religious_rating community_scale 
Amount_disbursed Installment Eff__Rate Voluntary_savings  esp_health 
loan_machine es_sales_0_5000 es_sales_5000_10000 es_sales_10000_15000 
es_sales_15000_20000 es_sales_20000_more sum_amount_disbursed_lc 
debt_othr loans_rec loan_paid_late debt_scale esp_rationing_scale 
credit_ration_food_agree credit_con_scale credit_busns_scale inc_risks 
interest_aware IncRate_More IncRate_Less DecRate_More DecRate_Less 
treatment_a interview_meeting Loan_Var_Diff Time_between_surveys 
ContainsNONE individual male var_length hm spm alc gua pp, ll(0) ul(2)  
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estimates store Tobit_Model_7 
 
estout *, varwidth(50) cells(b(star fmt(3)) se(par(`"="("'`")""') fmt(3))) legend 
postfoot("Notes: Ordinary Least Squares model reported; standard errors in 
parentheses.") label collabels(none)  varlabels(_cons Constant) title("Table 6-
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